Iran International
Iranian officials and analysts are publicly playing down the threat posed by a new defense pact between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey, even as some commentators warn Tehran against underestimating an emerging regional alignment.
Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said Monday that Iran had no reason to fear that the so-called Mecca Pact was directed against it, portraying the agreement instead as a response to Israeli ambitions and declining regional confidence in US security guarantees.
Seyed Abdollah Motavalian, a hardline commentator writing in the IRGC-affiliated Javan newspaper, similarly described the pact as having “considerable propaganda potential” but facing serious obstacles to becoming a strategic alliance.
He warned Tehran against making hasty decisions, particularly in negotiations with Washington, “based on fear of an alliance that has not yet taken shape amid propaganda hype.”
“Tehran’s strategic skill would be not to allow a political document, before it is tested against reality, to become an imaginary power in the calculations of decision-makers,” Motavalian wrote. “The first defeat in this arena may come not on the battlefield, but in the mind.”
Other Iranian commentary has emphasized the differing interests of the three countries and questioned whether Pakistan or Turkey would be willing to become directly involved in Saudi Arabia’s conflicts.
Their commitments, one analysis in Javan argued, may ultimately be limited to advisory support, weapons sales and joint exercises.
A retreat from Washington?
Iranian officials and state-affiliated media have also sought to interpret the agreement as evidence of Saudi Arabia’s frustration with Washington, particularly over what they describe as inadequate US protection against recent missile and drone attacks.
Tasnim, which is affiliated with the IRGC, argued that repeated attacks and Washington’s inability to contain the threat had pushed Riyadh to diversify its security relationships and reduce its reliance on the United States.
From Tehran’s perspective, that could carry potential benefits. A security architecture less dependent on Washington could weaken the United States’ traditionally dominant role in the region while creating additional complications for Israel.
The pact could also give Riyadh greater leverage in seeking stronger security guarantees from Washington, Iranian analysts said.
Pakistan or Turkey?
The involvement of Pakistan and Turkey nevertheless raises more complicated questions for Tehran.
Pakistan is a nuclear-armed power on Iran’s eastern border and has played an important role mediating between Tehran and Washington during the recent conflict.
Iranian commentators seeking to minimize the threat point out that Islamabad did not act against Iran during the 40-day Iran-US war despite its existing defense relationship with Saudi Arabia, instead helping mediate between the two sides.
Motavalian described Pakistan’s participation as part of “a multilayered deal and an increase in bargaining power,” rather than evidence of “the formation of a coherent war front.”
Turkey may present a different challenge.
Kamran Karami, a Persian Gulf security analyst writing for Donya-e Eqtesad, argued that Ankara’s participation could ultimately prove more consequential for Iran than Pakistan’s.
“For Iran, this development sends a clear message: Turkey is becoming one of the main poles of the Middle East’s new security architecture,” he wrote. Competition between Tehran and Ankara, he added, could gradually expand beyond economics and politics to “the design of the regional order.”
Others see Pakistan as the greater concern precisely because of its recent role as an intermediary with Washington. Tohid Javadi, a Middle East researcher, argued that turning a mediator into a rival security actor could complicate that relationship.
The possibility that other countries, including Egypt, could eventually join the arrangement has added to speculation that it might develop into a broader regional bloc.
Risks of underestimating pact
Not all Iranian commentary accepts the reassuring interpretation.
Asr-e Iran warned that dismissing the agreement as political theater could prove a mistake if it gradually develops military and security mechanisms capable of changing the regional balance.
Saudi Arabia brings financial resources, Pakistan military strength and nuclear capability, and Turkey one of the region’s most powerful armed forces, alongside considerable military experience and geopolitical reach.
Together, Asr-e Iran argued, they could eventually create a deterrent capable of limiting the room for maneuver of other regional powers, including Iran.
Fararu offered a similar warning, arguing that the significance of the pact is greater because it comes after a major Iran-US war whose underlying disputes remain unresolved.
The immediate purpose of such an alliance, it argued, need not be fighting a war. Its significance lies in changing the calculation before one begins.
“If Tehran, or any other actor, knows that an attack on Saudi Arabia could trigger a response from Turkey and Pakistan as well, the cost-benefit calculation of an attack changes,” the analysis said.
“In simple terms, the pact seeks to create a new equation: an attack on Saudi Arabia is no longer just an attack on Saudi Arabia.”
The 71-year-old former commander-in-chief of the Revolutionary Guards was appointed secretary of the Supreme National Security Council after Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr resigned little more than four months into the job.
Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei separately appointed Rezaei as his representative on the council, consolidating his position in a body central to decisions on war, diplomacy and Iran's confrontation with the United States.
The appointment adds another chapter to a career spanning command of the Revolutionary Guards through most of the Iran-Iraq war, decades in senior political institutions and four attempts to become president.
It also returns to prominence a figure whose record encompasses one of Iran's most disputed wartime operations, an Interpol Red Notice over the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center in Argentina and years as a recurring subject of satire among Iranians online.
From Islamist militant to Guards commander
Born Mohsen Sabzevar Rezaei Mir-Ghaed in 1954, Rezaei became involved before the 1979 revolution with Mansouroun, an armed Islamist organization opposed to the monarchy.
Following the revolution, Mansouroun and six other Islamist organizations joined to form the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution Organization.
Rezaei's ascent through the new political order was rapid. Ruhollah Khomeini appointed him commander-in-chief of the Revolutionary Guards in 1981, when Rezaei was 27 and Iran was a year into its war with Iraq.
He remained in command until 1997, overseeing the Guards for almost the entire eight-year war and during its transformation from an armed organization into one of Iran's principal centers of military power.
Rezaei left military command in 1997 and moved into the Expediency Council, becoming its longtime secretary. He later served as vice president for economic affairs under President Ebrahim Raisi.
Politics did not deliver the electoral success he sought.
Rezaei entered presidential contests repeatedly, running in 2005 before withdrawing shortly before voting, and contesting elections in 2009, 2013 and 2021 without winning. His repeated appearances on presidential ballots eventually generated a running joke on Persian-language social media that wherever an election was taking place, Rezaei would inevitably become a candidate.
Karbala-4 and a dispute that followed him for decades
No episode of Rezaei's military career has generated more lasting controversy inside Iran than Operation Karbala-4, launched against Iraqi forces in December 1986.
Rezaei was commander of the Revolutionary Guards when Iranian forces embarked on the operation. Accounts from commanders and participants later indicated that Iraqi forces had obtained advance knowledge of the offensive.
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who commanded Iran's war effort at the political level, later recalled learning shortly before the operation that it had been compromised.
Precise casualty figures remain disputed. Rafsanjani's wartime accounts put the toll at around 1,000 killed, 3,900 missing and 11,000 wounded.
The operation acquired renewed public significance decades later, particularly after the remains of 175 Iranian combat divers were returned to Iran in 2015.
Rezaei reopened the controversy in 2018 when he wrote that Karbala-4 had been conducted to deceive Iraq before Iran launched the larger Karbala-5 offensive days later.
The description prompted criticism from veterans, former officials and military figures who argued that Karbala-4 had been designed as a genuine major offensive rather than a diversion.
Rezaei later clarified his remarks, saying Karbala-4 had indeed begun as a main operation but had subsequently been turned into a deception after the decision was made to withdraw.
An audio recording of Rezaei speaking to division commander Hossein Kharrazi during the opening phase also attracted attention because Rezaei could be heard instructing forces to continue advancing.
For critics, the episode became a wider argument over wartime accountability: whether commanders persisted with an operation despite evidence that Iraqi forces were prepared for it, and whether the later characterization of it as deception obscured the original plan.
Wanted in Argentina over AMIA bombing
Rezaei's years commanding the Guards also left him facing an international arrest request.
Argentina has sought him in connection with the July 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, which killed 85 people and injured hundreds.
Interpol's Executive Committee approved a Red Notice for Rezaei and five other suspects in 2007 following a request from Argentina. Its General Assembly upheld the decision later that year.
Argentine authorities say Rezaei participated in a meeting at which the attack was decided. Rezaei and Iran have rejected Iranian responsibility.
His international travel has periodically revived the dispute. Argentina sought his arrest when he visited Qatar in 2022, without success.
Hostages for billions
Rezaei's public comments have also periodically generated controversy at home.
In 2015, he suggested that if the United States attacked Iran, Iranian forces could capture at least 1,000 Americans in the first week and demand billions of dollars for each one's release.
The proceeds, he suggested, could solve Iran's economic problems.
Such remarks, combined with his unsuccessful presidential campaigns and frequent television appearances, helped create a second public persona far removed from the image of the young wartime commander.
For some users on Persian-language social media, Rezaei became a stock character for political jokes.
That response resurfaced when Mojtaba Khamenei appointed him military adviser following the 2026 war. Users mocked everything from his return to office to the positioning of his belt buckle, which has itself become a longstanding internet meme.
Appointment revives criticism and ridicule online
Rezaei’s return to a senior security position prompted criticism and satire on X, where Iranian users revisited his wartime record, repeated presidential campaigns and controversial public remarks.
“Is Mohsen Rezaei’s military record, particularly during the war with Iraq, really defensible?” one user wrote. “Where does this extraordinary desire come from? From calling the Karbala-4 failure a deception operation, or from his idea of taking hostages to make money?”
Another user invoked the casualties of Karbala-4 more directly.
“Do you know that a huge number of young people in Operation Karbala-4 never saw the next morning?” the user wrote. “Yes, guess who the commander was. That’s right, Mohsen Rezaei.”
Some users instead interpreted the appointment through Iran’s internal power struggles.
One argued that the Revolutionary Guards had gained influence during the war while technocrats controlled the government, leaving the clergy with diminished power. The user portrayed Rezaei, a veteran Guards commander long removed from operational command, as a possible vehicle for restoring some of that influence.
Another suggested Rezaei’s appointment could strengthen parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, himself a former senior Guards commander.
Other posts sought to connect the reshuffle to reports of friction involving President Masoud Pezeshkian, with one user asking whether Rezaei’s appointment made previous reports about the president considering resignation more credible.
Speculation over Pezeshkian’s position had begun before Rezaei’s appointment.
Mohammad Bagher Kharrazi, secretary-general of the Hezbollah of Iran political group, predicted the security council reshuffle in remarks circulated widely on social media, portraying it as part of an effort to constrain President Masoud Pezeshkian.
Kharrazi said that Pezeshkian had resigned or threatened to resign 28 times and that Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei had grown frustrated with him and warned that another resignation would be accepted.
“That is why they are changing the Supreme National Security Council, moving Mr Zolghadr and replacing him with Mr Mohsen Rezaei,” Kharrazi said.
The prediction gained renewed attention after Zolghadr stepped down and Rezaei was appointed in his place.
Pezeshkian and Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s office have denied accounts that the president repeatedly offered or threatened to resign.
A survivor returns
Rezaei's latest promotion comes at a markedly different moment from the one in which he first accumulated power.
The Supreme National Security Council has undergone rapid leadership changes following the killing of its former secretary Ali Larijani in March and Zolghadr's brief tenure afterward.
Rezaei now takes charge as Iran confronts the consequences of war and negotiations over the Strait of Hormuz, where he has taken an uncompromising public position.
He said in July that control over the waterway was “more important than dozens of atomic bombs,” and more recently said Iran would not accept an unauthorized shipping route through the Strait.
The appointment nevertheless puts a familiar figure back at the center of the system he helped build: a commander whose career has survived military setbacks, electoral defeats, international accusations and decades of political change, and who now again occupies one of the most consequential seats in Iranian national security policy.
