Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has ordered legal proceedings to begin to revoke the citizenship of Israelis convicted of serious espionage on behalf of Iran, officials said, in what they described as an unprecedented move.
The directive, issued with the backing of Attorney-General Gali Baharav-Miara, instructs authorities to pursue revocation only after a final, binding conviction for severe espionage offenses linked to the Islamic Republic.
Netanyahu told a closed-door meeting that spying against Israel constituted “a fundamental breach of trust,” according to officials familiar with the discussion, Israeli media reported.
Under Israel’s Citizenship Law, nationality can be revoked for a breach of loyalty, including espionage or treason. The provision has rarely been used and was previously considered mainly in terrorism-related cases.
Officials said that in practical terms, individuals stripped of citizenship who hold no other nationality would retain permanent residency and could continue living in Israel, though they would lose civil rights such as voting.
Over the past two years, around 40 indictments have been filed against about 60 suspects accused of being recruited by Iran, according to officials. Israel’s Shin Bet security service has warned of a rise in Iranian efforts to recruit Israeli citizens, describing it as a growing national security threat.
The latest US-Iran diplomacy may reflect coordinated pressure rather than compromise, analysts told Iran International’s Eye for Iran podcast, describing Washington and Jerusalem as playing a potential “good cop, bad cop” strategy.
Middle East analyst Dr. Eric Mandel said the contrasting public tones adopted by US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu should not necessarily be read as disagreement.
“This could be a giant ruse — Netanyahu and Trump playing bad cop, good cop,” Mandel said, arguing that diplomacy may be designed to demonstrate that all political options were exhausted before stronger measures are considered.
Former US ambassador John Craig echoed that assessment.
“The pressure is deliberate,” Craig said, adding that talks could represent “a prequel… to military action,” as Washington increases its force posture in the region.
Military buildup alongside diplomacy
That military posture has become increasingly visible. President Donald Trump has said he is considering sending a second US aircraft carrier to the Middle East as tensions with Tehran escalate, describing an expanding naval deployment intended to reinforce American leverage.
“We have an armada that is heading there and another one might be going,” Trump said in an interview with Axios, signaling that additional forces could be deployed if diplomacy fails.
The United States has already positioned the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group, accompanied by destroyers armed with long-range Tomahawk missiles, within the US Central Command area covering the Middle East.
The Pentagon has also moved additional fighter jets, air defense systems and other military assets into the region.
Defense planners are weighing further options should Trump authorize a broader buildup, including the possible deployment of additional carrier groups.
The military movements come as Washington pursues indirect talks with Iranian officials over Tehran’s nuclear program — the first such discussions since US strikes targeted three major Iranian nuclear facilities last June was held in Oman last week. A second meeting is set to continue this week in Geneva.
At the same time, the Trump administration has warned US commercial vessels to avoid parts of the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman.
Netanyahu struck a notably cautious tone following his meeting with Trump in Washington, the seventh between the two leaders since the US president returned to office.
Speaking before departing the United States, the Israeli prime minister said Trump believes Iran could still be pushed into accepting what he called “a good deal,” but made clear he remains doubtful.
“I do not hide my general skepticism about the possibility of reaching any agreement with Iran,” Netanyahu said, stressing that any deal must address ballistic missiles and Tehran’s regional proxy network in addition to its nuclear program.
Trump, meanwhile, warned that failure to reach an agreement would be “very traumatic for Iran,” while urging Tehran to move quickly toward accepting US conditions.
Pressure grows as unrest inside Iran deepens
The diplomacy is unfolding against the backdrop of one of the deadliest crackdowns in the Islamic Republic’s history. Iranian security forces opened fire on nationwide protests on January 8-9 with at least 36 thousand killed in a matter of days as demonstrations spread across multiple cities.
Voices connected to people inside Iran, shared on Eye for Iran, suggest that the internal crisis is shaping how many Iranians now view international negotiations.
Mina, an Iranian speaking on the program whose friends were killed or imprisoned during the protests, described a level of desperation.
“There are people in Iran who watch the air traffic every night to see if there are fewer airplanes in the sky,” she said. “Maybe tonight intervention will come.”
Her account reflects a growing sentiment among some protesters who, after years of failed reform movements and escalating repression, say they no longer believe internal change alone is possible.
Many, she said, now see outside pressure — including potential military action — as the only remaining path to ending the rule of the Islamic Republic.
Analysts say that reality adds urgency to the current diplomatic moment. Washington emphasizes negotiations, while Israel highlights the risks of delay, creating what Mandel described as a coordinated messaging strategy rather than a clear policy divide.
“The president wants to show he has gone to the nth degree diplomatically,” Mandel said.
“But that doesn’t mean other options disappear.”
Craig argued the visible military buildup is intended to shape Iranian calculations during talks, warning Tehran may attempt to prolong negotiations to buy time — a pattern seen in previous nuclear negotiations.
Netanyahu’s skepticism mirrors longstanding Israeli concerns that agreements focused narrowly on nuclear restrictions fail to address broader threats posed by Iran’s missile program and proxy forces operating across the region.
The Israeli leader also announced he would not return to Washington next week for a planned Board of Peace gathering and will instead address the AIPAC conference virtually, a move that has fueled speculation about the urgency surrounding current Iran discussions.
“If you told me tonight something dramatic happened,” Mandel said, “I wouldn’t be surprised.”
Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu believes only direct engagement with US President Donald Trump can prevent a limited nuclear deal with Iran—and turn this moment into a decisive blow against the Islamic Republic.
Netanyahu’s sudden trip to Washington on Tuesday is not routine diplomacy. It reflects his deep concern that renewed US–Iran talks in Oman could drift toward a narrow nuclear agreement that would stabilize Tehran rather than confront it.
Recent statements by President Trump have focused almost exclusively on the nuclear file. After the meeting on Wednesday, he said he told Netanyahu that he prefers a negotiated settlement with Iran and hopes Tehran is more reasonable than it was in 2025.
For Netanyahu, this signals a familtiar danger: pressure within the United States to settle for a deal that curbs uranium enrichment while leaving Iran’s missile arsenal, regional network of proxies, and broader strategic posture intact.
Netanyahu appears to believe this moment is unique—that Iran is weaker than it has been in years: economically strained, internally divided, and strategically exposed after recent regional confrontations. In his assessment, a limited agreement would squander a rare opportunity to alter the regime’s trajectory, particularly at a time of unprecedented US military presence in the region.
As in past confrontations with US administrations, Netanyahu is expected to arrive armed with intelligence briefings and a historical argument tailored to Trump himself. The message is likely to be direct: presidents are remembered for moments when they reshape history, not defer it. This, he will argue, is such a moment.
Netanyahu will also push for broadening negotiations to include Iran’s ballistic missile program—a threat not only to Israel but to US forces and regional allies.
Tehran is unlikely to accept such terms. Iranian officials have asserted this many times. Yet from Netanyahu’s perspective, that refusal would strengthen the case for a tougher American response. If Tehran accepts expanded terms, its capacity to project power would be significantly reduced.
There is also a domestic dimension.
Netanyahu seeks to reinforce his image as the leader most capable of confronting Iran while maintaining close ties with the US. That positioning carries particular weight after earlier claims that Israel had neutralized key Iranian threats—claims now tempered by recognition that deterrence alone may not suffice.
Underlying this approach is a broader strategic conclusion: Israel can manage Iran’s proxies, but it cannot indefinitely manage the regime itself. Only a fundamental shift in Tehran, whether through internal collapse or decisive US-led military pressure, would transform Israel’s long-term security equation.
Netanyahu’s decision to engage Trump directly also reflects skepticism toward the president’s diplomatic circle, particularly advisers who favor a pragmatic nuclear arrangement that stabilizes tensions in the short term while leaving the core challenge unresolved.
From Netanyahu’s standpoint, the risk of a narrow agreement is clear. Economic relief for Tehran could dilute international urgency and complicate future coalition-building against Iran while constraining Israel’s freedom of action.
Yet this strategy carries risks of its own.
Netanyahu may underestimate the resistance his approach could encounter within the United States, especially among segments of the MAGA movement increasingly skeptical of foreign entanglements. While Trump himself has shown openness to assertive uses of power, much of his political base is wary of being drawn into another Middle Eastern confrontation.
Historical memory also shapes the landscape. Netanyahu’s 2002 congressional testimony supporting military action in Iraq—and the subsequent costs of that war—still resonates in Washington. Advocacy framed as preventive or regime-targeting military action inevitably triggers those comparisons.
Israel could face heightened scrutiny and erosion of political goodwill should US–Iran tensions escalate in ways perceived domestically as externally driven or strategically avoidable.
In seeking to shape US policy at a pivotal moment, Netanyahu is pursuing what he sees as strategic necessity. But in doing so, he risks complicating Israel’s long-term standing within an increasingly divided American political landscape.
One month after a sweeping and deadly crackdown on nationwide protests, Islamic Republic marked its anniversary with state-organized rallies that appeared designed to project strength even as anti-government chants reverberated across neighborhoods nationwide.
The annual commemoration of the 1979 Islamic Revolution has long served as a showcase of mass loyalty. This year, however, it unfolded under the shadow of what critics describe as a deepening crisis of legitimacy following the January bloodshed.
In Tehran, security forces and Basij units maintained a visible presence as supporters gathered in Azadi Square. State media broadcast images of families and children waving flags, and highlighted what it portrayed as festive participation across the country.
Among the more striking displays were symbolic coffins bearing the names and photos of senior US military officials, including US Army Chief of Staff Randy George and CENTCOM Commander Brad Cooper. Cooper was part of the US delegation that recently held talks with Iranian officials in Oman.
American and Israeli flags were also burned during the rally.
The imagery of defiance came as Iranian officials engage in renewed diplomatic contacts with the United States. The juxtaposition reflected a dual message: confrontation abroad and consolidation at home.
President Masoud Pezeshkian, addressing the rally, repeated the government’s narrative about the recent unrest, accusing protesters of sabotage and violence and saying “no Iranian takes up arms to kill another Iranian.”
He acknowledged widespread dissatisfaction but said the government was prepared to “hear the voice of the people,” while emphasizing loyalty to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and adherence to his “red lines” in diplomacy, a tacit reference to Iran’s uranium enrichment, missile program and support for regional militia groups.
State television placed particular emphasis on images of children and families at the rallies, a move that analysts say may reflect efforts to soften the government’s image after weeks of reports about civilian casualties.
Rights advocates have long criticized the use of minors in political events, arguing that it instrumentalizes children for propaganda purposes.
The commemorations took place roughly a month after a violent suppression of protests that erupted in late December.
The editorial board of Iran International said earlier this month that more than 36,500 people had been killed in a targeted crackdown ordered by Khamenei.
Even as the government staged its anniversary spectacle, dissent surfaced in other forms. On the eve of 22 Bahman, residents in multiple neighborhoods of Tehran – including Narmak, Ekbatan, Majidieh and Naziabad – shouted slogans such as “Death to Khamenei” and “Death to the dictator” from rooftops and balconies. Similar chants were reported in cities including Mashhad, Arak, Qazvin, Kermanshah and Shahriar.
Videos circulating online showed nighttime fireworks lighting the sky as anti-government slogans rang out.
In one clip from Arak, residents could be heard chanting against Khamenei in response to mosque loudspeakers broadcasting the traditional “Allahu Akbar.”
In Tehran, one resident said the fireworks were so loud “we thought America had attacked.”
In isolated incidents, pro-government speakers appeared to inadvertently repeat anti-Khamenei slogans during live broadcasts, prompting abrupt cuts in coverage.
One state reporter in Sistan and Baluchestan was heard listing “Death to Khamenei” among rally chants before the feed was interrupted.
Political analyst Iman Aghayari told Iran International that the anniversary had become “an arena of confrontation between the government and the people,” adding that unlike in previous years, authorities seemed less concerned with demonstrating broad public backing and more focused on asserting control.
“This time,” he said, “the regime is not trying to prove people are with it. It is simply declaring that it rules.”
As Iran navigates renewed diplomacy abroad and mounting pressure at home, the 22 Bahman (February 11) anniversary appeared to reflect a widening gap between official displays of unity and the anger that continues to surface beyond the state’s stage-managed events.
Iran International has obtained information alleging that senior Iranian diplomats transported large amounts of cash to Beirut in recent months, using diplomatic passports to move funds to Lebanon’s Hezbollah.
The transfers involved at least six Iranian diplomats who carried suitcases filled with US dollars on commercial flights to Lebanon, according to the information.
The cash deliveries formed part of efforts to help Hezbollah rebuild its finances and operational capacity after sustaining significant blows to its leadership, weapons stockpiles and funding networks.
Those involved include Mohammad Ebrahim Taherianfard, a former ambassador to Turkey and senior Foreign Ministry official; Mohammad Reza Shirkhodaei, a veteran diplomat and former consul general in Pakistan; his brother Hamidreza Shirkhodaei; Reza Nedaei; Abbas Asgari; and Amir-Hamzeh Shiranirad, a former Iranian embassy employee in Canada.
Taherianfard traveled to Beirut in January alongside Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. He carried a suitcase filled with dollars, relying on diplomatic immunity to avoid airport inspection.
Similar methods were used on other trips, with diplomats transporting cash directly through Beirut’s Rafik Hariri International Airport.
Ali Larijani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, also traveled to Beirut in October and carried hundreds of millions of dollars in cash, according to the information.
After Israeli strikes disrupted weapons and cash-smuggling routes used by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards in Syria, Beirut airport emerged as a primary channel for direct cash deliveries.
Hezbollah’s longstanding influence over security structures at the airport has in the past facilitated such transfers, though Lebanese authorities have recently increased control.
The cash shipments come as Hezbollah faces acute financial strain. The group has struggled to pay fighters and to finance reconstruction in parts of southern Lebanon heavily damaged in fighting. Rebuilding costs have been estimated in the billions of dollars.
In January 2025, The Wall Street Journal reported that Israel had accused Iran of funneling tens of millions of dollars in cash to Hezbollah through Beirut airport, with Iranian diplomats and other couriers allegedly carrying suitcases stuffed with US dollars to help the group recover after major losses.
Israel filed complaints with the US-led cease-fire oversight committee, while Iran, Turkey and Hezbollah denied wrongdoing. The report said tighter scrutiny at Beirut airport and the disruption of routes through Syria had made such cash shipments a more prominent channel for funding.
On Tuesday, the US Treasury announced new sanctions targeting what it described as key mechanisms Hezbollah uses to sustain its finances, including coordination with Iran and exploitation of Lebanon’s informal cash economy.
The Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned Lebanese gold exchange company Jood SARL, which operates under the supervision of US-designated Al-Qard Al-Hassan, a Hezbollah-linked financial institution. Treasury said Jood converts Hezbollah’s gold reserves into usable funds and helps the group mitigate liquidity pressures.
OFAC also sanctioned an international procurement and commodities shipping network involving Hezbollah financiers operating from multiple jurisdictions, including Iran.
“Hezbollah is a threat to peace and stability in the Middle East,” Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said in a statement, adding that the United States would continue working to cut the group off from the global financial system.
Iran has long considered Hezbollah a central pillar of its regional alliance network and has provided the group with financial, military and logistical support for decades.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s hastily advanced trip to Washington this week underscores the rising stakes surrounding renewed diplomacy between Iran and the United States.
Originally scheduled for February 18, the visit was brought forward by a week following fresh indirect talks in Oman that both sides have indicated could resume in the coming days.
Netanyahu is expected to press President Donald Trump to impose firm constraints on Iran’s ballistic-missile program and its support for armed groups in the region. But the urgency of the meeting appears to reflect more than immediate tactical concerns, pointing to a blunter effort by Israel to shape US policy rather than simply align with it.
Trump has repeatedly signaled his preference for a "deal with Iran." But Netanyahu remains wary that negotiations might focus narrowly on the nuclear file and leave unaddressed what he sees as Tehran broader threat ecosystem.
That gap was evident during the previous round of US–Iran talks in the spring of 2025.
While Trump conveyed optimism about diplomatic openings and outlined prospective nuclear proposals, reporting suggested Netanyahu remained unconvinced, ultimately awaiting the expiration of Washington’s 60-day deadline before launching strikes that became the 12-Day War.
Even after US bombers joined strikes on Iran’s Natanz and Fordow nuclear sites, Washington reportedly urged Israel to scale back operations as Israeli forces moved closer to senior figures following the killing of top Revolutionary Guards commanders.
Israeli and Western officials say Iran has since moved to restore damaged ballistic-missile infrastructure, in some cases prioritising missile sites over nuclear facilities. Iranian officials have also publicly pointed to renewed—even enhanced—missile capabilities, reinforcing Israeli concerns about Tehran’s readiness to deploy them in a future confrontation.
It is against that backdrop that Israel has watched recent diplomatic signals from Tehran and Washington with growing unease.
Iran has reintroduced senior figures into the diplomatic arena, including Ali Larijani, a longtime adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who has held consultations alongside the Muscat talks. His reappearance has been read in Israel as a sign that Tehran is seeking to project flexibility while resisting constraints on missiles and regional networks.
Those moves have coincided with messaging from within Trump’s political orbit emphasizing diplomatic opportunity.
Remarks by J.D. Vance, cautioning against escalation and underscoring the potential for a negotiated outcome, have been noted closely in Jerusalem, where officials have long worried that talks could narrow toward the nuclear file alone.
Taken together, these developments appear to have heightened Israeli concern that its core security priorities could be sidelined as diplomatic momentum builds—helping explain Netanyahu’s decision to advance his Washington visit rather than wait.
Netanyahu’s publicly stated red lines, particularly Iran’s arsenal of more than 1,800 ballistic missiles, align not only with Israeli threat assessments but with those of key Arab states.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have borne the costs of Iran’s regional tactics firsthand. Iran-supplied Houthi drones and missiles struck Saudi Aramco’s Abqaiq processing facility in 2019 and later targeted infrastructure near Jeddah in 2022.
Israel’s September 2025 strike on Hamas leaders in Doha strained but did not sever quiet channels with Qatar.
Despite public friction, Persian Gulf states involved in the Abraham Accords and Qatar continued to participate in US-led security discussions in which Israeli intelligence on Iran was reportedly shared, underscoring the resilience of regional threat coordination.
At the same time, Iran’s Arab neighbors have actively sought to contain escalation and, in some cases, helped create the conditions for diplomacy.
While they share Israel’s assessment of the missile and proxy threat, they have often favored de-escalation and engagement as a means of managing it—highlighting a divergence not over the nature of the threat, but over how best to reduce it.
Netanyahu’s visit to Washington reflects an effort to push back against that regional pull toward accommodation, pressing for a harder line on Tehran that addresses Israel’s security concerns. He appears to view Iran’s nuclear latency, missile expansion and regional outreach as a single, interlocking challenge.
Israel’s objective, therefore, is not episodic deterrence but the steady erosion of the capabilities that allow Tehran to sustain an existential threat posture—a logic shaping Netanyahu’s diplomacy in Washington as much as Israel’s readiness to act alone.