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ANALYSIS

Will Iran's ultra-hardliners make gains in upcoming local elections?

Maryam Sinaiee
Maryam Sinaiee

Iran International

Feb 24, 2025, 15:07 GMT+0Updated: 22:02 GMT+0
Ultra-hardliner politician Saeed Jalili
Ultra-hardliner politician Saeed Jalili

Ultra-hardliner Saeed Jalili and his allies—widely regarded as President Masoud Pezeshkian’s chief rivals—are maneuvering to expand their political influence through upcoming city and village council elections, according to Iranian media.

While Jalili only briefly referenced the importance of these elections in a speech last week, his public appearances and speeches have notably increased in recent months. In these speeches, Jalili emphasized that the development budget allocated to the country’s top cities exceeds the national development budget, pointing to the significance of these local councils.

“It appears that Jalili’s statements should be considered a signal of the [active] participation of him and his supporters in the seventh city council elections,” an article published by Rozan Online read on Saturday.

The publication’s report also argued that these elections could intensify rivalries within the hardliner/ultra-hardliner camp, particularly in cities like Tehran, where Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, a former mayor of the capital, and his supporters still wield some influence in the municipality.

Jalili and his supporters’ plans for the elections on June 19 will not only heighten competition among three factions—led by Jalili, incumbent Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani, and Ghalibaf—but could also lead to new coalitions or deeper divisions within this political faction, Rozan’s piece noted.

Ghalibaf has been relatively supportive of Pezeshkian’s “national unity” government and is often accused by Jalili’s supporters on social media of betraying the “revolutionary cause.”

Jalili has no executive experience. He led Iran’s nuclear negotiations during the presidency of populist Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and currently represents Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). Additionally, he serves on the Expediency Discernment Council (EDC), also by Khamenei’s appointment.

“The Jalili circle has become hyperactive in parliament and on social media in unison with him,” a piece by Khabar Online read – a media outlet linked to former conservative parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani.

The publication speculated on Saturday that securing control over city and village councils could be a stepping stone for Jalili’s presidential ambitions in the next election.

Khabar Online’s report also suggested that if Jalili’s supporters gain a majority in the Tehran City Council, he could position himself as the mayor of the capital, following Ahmadinejad’s footsteps, who later became president.

Jalili, who competed against Pezeshkian in the June 2024 runoff presidential election, does not formally lead any political party. However, he has strong backing from the ultra-hardliner Paydari Party and its allies, including the Iran Morning Front (Jebhe-ye Sobh-e Iran), a political party established only a year ago. Both parties officially endorsed and campaigned for Jalili in the recent presidential election.

Jalili and his supporters are staunchly opposed to any negotiations with the United States regarding Iran's nuclear program, missile capabilities, and regional influence. They also reject Iran's accession to Financial Action Task Force (FATF) conventions, which could help remove Iran from the global money-laundering watchdog’s blacklist.

The ultra-hardliner Paydari Party, a small but influential faction in parliament, has been behind several controversial legislative efforts, including the strict hijab law and the recent attempt to impeach Economy Minister Abdolnasser Hemmati. The Paydari Party and the Iran Morning Front also have a strong presence in key state institutions, including the state-run broadcasting organization (IRIB), where Jalili’s brother, Vahid Jalili, serves as a cultural deputy. In this role, he wields significant influence over IRIB’s policy direction.

The city and village council elections are the only elections in Iran that do not require candidate vetting by the ultra-hardliner Guardian Council, allowing for broader participation than in parliamentary and other elections.

In smaller towns and villages, competition in local government council elections is often driven by ethnic and tribal factors which may bring more voters to the ballot boxes.

However, in major cities like Tehran, where political concerns take precedence, voter turnout could be very low like in last year’s parliamentary elections.

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Economist warns of hyperinflation as Iran’s economy deteriorates

Feb 24, 2025, 11:41 GMT+0

An Iranian economist has warned that hyperinflation could take hold unless effective negotiations with the United States lead to the lifting of sanctions.

“Without easing sanctions through productive negotiations, reducing inflation seems unlikely,” Ghodratollah Emamverdi told Etemad newspaper on Monday. He cautioned that if monthly inflation reaches 50%, Iran could face hyperinflation. Currently, monthly inflation is at four percent, while annual inflation is estimated to be over 40%.

On Sunday, the only government agency reporting inflation figures announced an annual rate of 35%. However, labor groups and analysts contend that the government downplays negative economic news, suggesting the real inflation rate is much higher.

Emamverdi noted that although Iran’s inflation rate has not yet reached the critical 50% threshold, continued sanctions and internal political tensions could push the economy into hyperinflation.

Majid-Reza Hariri, former head of Iran’s chamber of commerce, criticized the presidential administration’s inability to address the current crisis, saying the government is effectively paralyzed.

“We either have a government or we don’t, and I personally believe we are facing a state of no government. If the government cannot solve economic problems, no one is forced to be president or minister,” Hariri said. He added that everyone in the current administration was aware of the situation by mid-2024 but still chose to run for office or accept ministerial positions.

President Masoud Pezeshkian has argued that Iran’s complex and deep-seated economic problems are too vast for his administration to resolve, implicitly pointing to the impact of sanctions. Following Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s ban on negotiations with the United States in early February, Pezeshkian expressed his support for the decision, aligning himself with Iran’s ultimate political authority. As the new Iranian year approaches on March 20, the government faces the challenge of setting pay raises for millions of workers, including those in government and quasi-public enterprises. Workers are demanding wage increases of up to 70% to keep pace with soaring inflation.

The Iranian rial has lost more than 50% of its value in the past six months, driving expectations of even higher inflation. Currently, the minimum wage stands at about $120 per month, while semi-official estimates indicate that at least $400 per month is needed to support a family of three.

The government is considering a wage increase of less than 50%, which would still leave workers struggling to afford basic necessities. However, even a smaller pay hike could further fuel inflation.

Ethnic activists in Iran call for education in mother tongues

Feb 23, 2025, 08:58 GMT+0
•
Maryam Sinaiee

Iran is a highly multilingual country, yet education in languages other than Persian is not permitted and its advocates often face persecution by security bodies for encouraging separatism.

This year, according to social media reports, activists in several northwestern cities, including Tabriz, Maragheh, and Ardabil, marked International Mother Language Day on February 21 by distributing children's books written in Torki on the streets. Torki is a Turkic language spoken by millions in the northwestern provinces of East and West Azarbaijan, Ardabil, and parts of Zanjan and other provinces.

Similarly, in some Kurdish cities, activists celebrated the occasion by distributing leaflets and posters to raise awareness of their cause.

The United Nations General Assembly designated February 21 as International Mother Language Day in 1999 to promote awareness of linguistic and cultural diversity and to promote multilingualism.

Iran is home to many ethnic groups, each with its own language, including Kurds, Torki, Gilaks, Baluchis, Arabs, and Turkmen. Torki, and Kurdish -- mostly spoken in western province -- have the largest number of speakers.

Children singing in Torki at a shopping mall in Tabriz, East Azarbaijan, on International Mother Language Day

There are no official statistics on the number of speakers of these or other languages, such as Arabic, which is spoken in the southwestern province of Khuzestan, or Balochi, spoken in the southeastern province of Sistan and Baluchestan.

Many members of ethnic groups, specially in urban centers, speak Persian as all education, including textbooks, is in Persian.

The government often view the demand for education in native languages as linked to separatism and suppress its organized advocacy.

Persian has been the official language of most Iranian dynasties throughout the Islamic period, including the Safavid and Qajar dynasties, whose rulers were native speakers of Torki. It has also served as the country’s literary language and lingua franca.

Activists distributing posters and leaflets in the Kurdish city of Marivan on International Mother Language Day.

Before the establishment of a modern educational system in 1925 by Reza Shah, the founder of the Pahlavi Dynasty, literacy was largely restricted to the upper class and the clergy, who ran small schools called maktab to teach literacy. In 1936, maktabs were shut down, and primary education in new public schools became compulsory for all children.

Since then, Persian has remained the sole language of government, media and education in Iran, despite Article 15 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, which was drafted months after the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

This article permits the use of ethnic languages in the press and media and allows for their literature to be taught alongside Persian in schools. However, the government has never implemented these provisions by incorporating ethnic languages into public education. Independent schools and language institutes are also barred from offering courses for other local languages.

While state-run provincial radio and television stations broadcast some programs in Kurdish, Torki, Arabic, Baluchi, and Turkmen, their content largely reflects the government’s Islamic ideology and propaganda.

Authorities frequently crack down on unofficial ethnic language classes conducted by volunteer “mother language” activists, particularly in Torki and Kurdish-speaking areas.

For example, on February 21, the Kurdish human rights group Kurdpa reported that seven activists had been arrested over the past year for promoting the teaching of the Kurdish language and were sentenced to a total of 16 years in prison.

Advocates for teaching ethnic languages argue that their cultures and languages are at risk due to the dominance of Persian in Iran’s educational system.

Critics, however, counter-argue that introducing education in non-Persian languages could weaken Persian’s role as the official language, threaten national unity by fueling sectarianism, complicate the education system, and increase its costs.

Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian, a native speaker of both Torki and Kurdish, the languages spoken by his own parents, is one of the very few officials who has ever defended the right to giving official status to ethnic languages based on Article 15 of the Iranian Constitution.

He argued against critics, when he was a lawmaker, that using these languages in schools, contrary to their beliefs, could even strengthen national unity.

Iranians protest soaring prices and worsening economic crisis

Feb 22, 2025, 15:50 GMT+0

Citizens engaging with Iran International have sent videos reporting a sharp rise in the prices of essential goods and expressing deep dissatisfaction with the inefficiency and neglect by Islamic Republic officials.

In the reports, people highlight the increasing pressure on their livelihoods, complaining about the lack of response to their protests and the absence of effective measures to control prices.

One viewer, sharing a video, said that they had purchased only a few kilograms of potatoes, onions, and tomatoes, and the cost of these three items had reached 7,000,000 rials, approximately one-seventeenth of the average monthly Iranian salary.

The simultaneous surge in prices and worsening economic hardship, along with leaked reports of the Islamic Republic's financial aid to its supporters in Lebanon, has drawn significant attention from Iranian citizens.

One Iran International viewer, referring to the high food prices, said in a video: "The Iranian government gives money to the Lebanese, but does not care about its own people."

On Tuesday, Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, met in Tehran with leaders of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, who visited Tehran seeking financial assistance. Meanwhile, Hezbollah in Lebanon has been opening new branches of interest-free loan funds to distribute financial aid from the Islamic Republic.

Tehran has recently allocated more than $10,000 to each war-affected family in Lebanon to help cover rent and household expenses. This aid is distributed among Shiite Lebanese who are supporters of Hezbollah.

Naim Qassem, the newly appointed Secretary-General of Hezbollah, described the funds as a "gift from the Islamic Republic."

Inflation in Iran has reached an uncontrollable level, with the Iranian Statistics Center announcing that the country’s annual inflation rate for the 12 months leading up to February 2025 stands at 32%.

Shoppers at Tehran's historic Bazaar. File photo
100%
Shoppers at Tehran's historic Bazaar. File photo

The Iranian currency, rial, has depreciated by more than 50% since September fueling annual inflation, which has hovered around 40% in the past five years.

Citizens hold the Islamic Republic and its policies responsible for their economic hardship and the rising cost of food and medicine.

Even Islamic Republic officials have acknowledged their inability to resolve the current crises.

President Masoud Pezeshkian referring to shortages in various sectors—including energy, which the government labels as imbalances—said:

"Do you think I have a magic box? No. Six months ago, I was walking in Parliament, and now I am the President."

Speaking at a meeting with officials in western Tehran on Thursday, Pezeshkian added:

"Everywhere we look, there is an imbalance—in water, electricity, gas, money, land, schools, and hospital beds. Demand is unlimited, and our capacity is limited."

Meanwhile, on Friday, Mohammad Jamalian, a member of Parliament’s Health Committee, said:

"Currently, 350 to 400 types of medicine are in short supply, and in the best-case scenario, such shortages will worsen within the next one to two months."

Prominent lawmaker proposes Khamenei directly appoint Iran's presidents

Feb 22, 2025, 07:55 GMT+0
•
Behrouz Turani

A senior member of the Iranian parliament (Majles) has proposed replacing Iran's problematic presidential election system with a model in which the Supreme Leader directly appoints the President.

Speaking to Didban Iran (Iran Monitor) on Thursday, Osman Salari, the deputy chairman of the parliament's legal committee, defended his proposed system, arguing that it “is not against religious democracy.” In Iran’s political structure, this form of pseudo-democracy restricts voter choice by allowing only candidates approved and shortlisted by the hardliner-dominated Guardian Council to appear on the ballot. In addition, political parties are severely restricted, and media is either government owned or monitored and controlled.

Salari added that although the Supreme Leader is the true head of the government, there is nothing wrong with him appointing a President to lead the executive branch.

Several Iranian media outlets and politicians have previously suggested replacing the public election of the President with a parliamentary system in which the President is chosen by members of parliament.

Public trust in the president's office and the tightly controlled election system has declined over the past 15 years, as it has become increasingly clear that the president has limited authority over major state issues.

According to the government-owned Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA), the parliamentary system was most recently discussed in January 2022 when the agency analyzed the pros and cons of the two systems, drawing on the views of prominent Iranian political scientist Hossein Bashirieh.

ISNA outlined the advantages and disadvantages in a report, stating, "In the presidential system, both the parliament and the President are elected by the people for fixed terms. The parliament cannot remove the President from office, although it can impeach him. Conversely, the President does not have the authority to dissolve the parliament."

ISNA contrasted this with the parliamentary system, noting, "In the parliamentary system, the parliament can dismiss the head of the government (usually a prime minister) by withdrawing its vote of confidence. The Prime Minister also has the power to dissolve the parliament and call for new elections." The report also highlighted that the separation of the three branches of government is more clearly defined in the parliamentary system.

The push by Iranian politicians and media to change the political system stems from the ongoing conflict between the Supreme Leader and the President since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979. Since Khamenei became Supreme Leader the situation has gradually worsened as he has systematically monopolized power.

As Salari observed in his interview with Didban Iran, "all of Iran's former Presidents since 1989 have been accused of deviation," and Khamenei distanced himself from each of them before the end of their terms. Salari added that although these Presidents initially received Khamenei's endorsement, they often pursued political, economic, and social policies that diverged from his views. This divergence complicated decision-making, particularly on key economic and foreign policy issues.

Salari argued that “directly appointing presidents by Khamenei is still democratic because Khamenei was indirectly elected by the people.” However, this claim is controversial given the circumstances of his election by the Assembly of Experts, which was heavily influenced by its former deputy chairman, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Videos available online show Rafsanjani using his considerable influence to suppress opposition to Khamenei’s election.

In 2011, Khamenei expressed support for the idea of the president being elected by parliament, but he did not pursue it further despite the concept being revisited several times since then.

However, Salari's proposal is fundamentally different, as it places the choice of a president in the hands of one individual. It is unlikely that this idea will progress beyond mere suggestion, as Khamenei has consistently avoided taking direct responsibility for decisions that could significantly impact the structure of the government. He appears to prefer having a president elected by others, allowing him to distance himself and criticize the president if things go wrong.

When to celebrate love in Iran: Valentine's Day or Espandgan?

Feb 21, 2025, 11:30 GMT+0
•
Maryam Sinaiee

Iran’s religious and political establishment is increasingly concerned that the growing popularity of pre-Islamic festivals, like Espandgan—celebrated as an alternative to Valentine’s Day—poses a threat to Islamic culture.

Over the past two decades, Valentine’s Day has grown increasingly popular in Iran, frustrating authorities who have spent nearly half a century trying to Islamicize society and shield young people from Western cultural influences.

In 2010, Iran’s police and judicial authorities condemned Valentine’s Day celebrations as part of a “Western cultural onslaught”, imposing a ban on businesses selling Valentine’s Day gifts and decorations.

Since then, police have occasionally cracked down on shops selling gifts and cafés hosting Valentine’s celebrations, where young people gather with red balloons, roses, teddy bears, and other tokens of affection. Despite these efforts, Valentine’s Day has continued to gain popularity, even spreading to religious cities such as Qom and Mashhad, home to two of Shiism’s most important shrines and seminaries.

Valentine's Day gift at a Tehran street market
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Valentine's Day gift at a Tehran street market

A call to revive Sepandarmazgan

Beyond government opposition, some Iranians also criticize the growing influence of Western holidays, advocating for the revival of ancient Iranian festivals instead. They argue that Sepandarmazgan, or Espandgan for short, offers a more culturally authentic alternative to Valentine’s Day.

Falling on February 23 this year, Sepandarmazgan is dedicated to Sepandarmaz (Holy Devotion), one of the seven divine entities emanating from Ahura Mazda, the Zoroastrian creator god.

In ancient Iranian tradition, Sepandarmaz was revered as a feminine divine force linked to the Earth and women, symbolizing fertility and prosperity. Unlike Anahita—an earlier goddess of love, fertility, and water whose worship was later absorbed into Zoroastrianism—Sepandarmaz was never portrayed in human form in ancient artifacts.

Sending text messages and giving gifts to loved ones on Espandgan instead of Valentine's Day has been gaining popularity in recent years.

According to a recent article published by the Student News Network, a hardline news outlet, presenting Espandgan as an alternative to Valentine’s Day fails to prevent the spread of Western cultural values. Instead, it merely repackages the same concepts in a form that contradicts the Islamic way of life.

Espandgan in history and modern Zoroastrianism

Iran’s Zoroastrian community, though now small, continues to celebrate Espandgan with solemn religious rituals and prayers, including recitations from the Avesta—their holy book—at fire temples and sacred shrines, such as Pir-e Sabz in Yazd.

According to the 11th-century historian Al-Biruni, however, Espandgan was widely observed in parts of Iran as a day honoring women. On this occasion, women were exempt from housework, and men showered their wives with gifts. Additionally, women freely expressed their love to the men they wished to marry, a tradition that resonates with modern romantic celebrations.

Government opposition to pre-Islamic traditions

Despite the historical significance of Espandgan, Iran’s religious and political establishment remains resistant to promoting pre-Islamic festivals as substitutes for Western celebrations like Valentine’s Day and Christmas—both of which remain widely celebrated despite official disapproval.

In recent years the celebration of Christmas has also become very popular in Iran.

Beyond Valentine's Day, the hardline religious and political establishment also opposes other ancient festivals including the Winter Solstice festival of Yalda (or Shab-e Chelleh) which marks the longest night of the year, and Charshanbeh Soori, a bonfire festival held on the evening of the last Tuesday before the Iranian New Year (Nowrouz) as relics of paganism.

Charshanbeh Soori often turns into a battle between the merry-making youth who celebrate it on the streets and the police, Basij militia of the Revolutionary Guards, and vigilante groups who crack down on them in larger cities such as Tehran.

In an attempt to counter pre-Islamic traditions and calendar events, authorities have sought to elevate Islamic occasions, designating the birthday of Fatima, daughter of Prophet Muhammad, as Women’s Day. The birthday of Imam Ali, the first Shiite Imam, has similarly been designated as Men’s Day while the anniversary of Fatima and Ali’s marriage has been added to the official calendar as Marriage Day.