A huge billboard in Tehran shows a clenched hand gripping a blue cloth shaped like the Strait of Hormuz, symbolizing Iran’s hold over the strategic waterway, with Persian text reading “Forever in Iran’s hands,” displayed above a busy intersection in the capital.
The US naval blockade of Iran is entering an opaque phase, with early signs of impact emerging through both buyer hesitation and deceptive shipping practices, rather than direct naval confrontations.
In the first 24 hours after the blockade took effect at 10 a.m. ET on April 13, US Central Command said “no ships made it past the US blockade” and that “6 merchant vessels complied with direction from US forces to turn around to re-enter an Iranian port on the Gulf of Oman.”
But shipping data, satellite imagery and industry monitoring suggest the real contest may be unfolding more quietly — and more ambiguously.
Maritime analysts have observed early shifts in tanker behavior near the Strait of Hormuz, with some vessels reversing course shortly after the blockade began.
Mike Schuler, managing editor of gCaptain, wrote on X that “Tankers may already be turning away from Hormuz,” citing AIS data showing “two vessels reversing course minutes after the US blockade began.”
Other vessels appear to be adapting more creatively.
TankerTrackers reported spotting a tanker departing Kharg Island while spoofing its AIS signal to suggest it had left Saudi Arabia instead.
AIS, or Automatic Identification System, is designed to broadcast a ship’s identity, location and route. But the practice of manipulating these signals has become a hallmark of so-called “dark fleet” operations, allowing sanctioned vessels to obscure their origins and evade scrutiny.
TankerTrackers noted separately that “Dark Fleet tankers in particular may change names and flags,” urging journalists to rely on IMO numbers to track vessels more reliably.
Taken together, these patterns suggest the blockade’s early phase is being defined less by visible interdictions and more by a cat-and-mouse dynamic at sea, with tankers probing the limits of surveillance and compliance.
Enforcement gaps and shadow fleet
At the same time, enforcement itself remains uneven.
Reuters reported that a sanctioned, Chinese-owned tanker — identified as Rich Starry — transited the Strait of Hormuz during the blockade period, alongside other vessels including Murlikishan and Peace Gulf.
According to TankerTrackers, Rich Starry is “a serial AIS spoofer and a designated sanctions violator with a history of transporting Iranian refined products.”
The vessel later turned back after reaching the Gulf of Oman, while other ships stopped transmitting AIS signals altogether after entering international waters, according to ship tracking data.
These movements underscore a central challenge for US enforcement: vessels can spoof tracking data, switch flags, change names and operate in legal gray zones that complicate interdiction.
Even as Washington signals control over access to Iranian ports, the persistence of such activity suggests enforcement may be partial, contested and dependent on constant monitoring.
Buyer hesitation
Beyond shipping itself, early signs indicate the blockade may be influencing buyer behavior — potentially a more decisive factor.
TankerTrackers reported that “two million barrels of Iranian crude turned up unannounced today in India,” adding later that “India won't be accepting this oil.”
That hesitation points to a broader risk for Tehran: even if cargoes can leave Iranian waters, they may struggle to find willing buyers.
Jason Brodsky, policy director at United Against Nuclear Iran, said Washington is “trying to flip the script on Iran” after Tehran sought to tighten control over Hormuz traffic earlier this month.
By signaling it can restrict Iranian access to the same waterway, he said, the United States is effectively telling Tehran, “not so fast, we have the ability to prevent you and your vessels from using the Strait of Hormuz.”
Why this may be different from sanctions
Some analysts say the blockade could alter the underlying economics of Iran’s oil trade in ways sanctions did not.
“The blockade is doing something that 20 years of sanctions couldn't actually do,” said Mohammad Machine-Chian, a senior journalist covering economic affairs at Iran International.
He said sanctions often created opportunities for regime-connected middlemen and black-market networks to profit.
By contrast, “blockade is making that business model unfeasible,” he said, suggesting pressure may now fall more directly on the networks that previously benefited from sanctions evasion.
Pressure builds over time
Still, experts caution against expecting immediate economic collapse.
Former Royal Navy commander Tom Sharpe described the blockade as “a lever of persuasion of coercion” designed to “make Iran more susceptible to negotiations.”
“The blockade on the blockade is a strong-arm tactic to make Iran more susceptible,” he said. “In other words, as a lever, this might be a good one.”
Brodsky also said the effects are likely to build over “weeks and months,” rather than producing an instant shock.
Miad Maleki, a former US Treasury official, estimated the blockade could inflict roughly $435 million in daily economic damage, underscoring the potential scale of pressure even as its early effects remain uneven.
For now, the blockade’s first real test may be less about whether ships can pass through Hormuz, and more about whether they can do so undetected — and whether buyers are still willing to take the risk once they arrive.
The US Treasury has warned banks in the Middle East and East Asia to halt Iran-linked transactions or face potential sanctions, signaling a stepped-up enforcement push targeting the financial networks that move Tehran’s oil revenues.
After the US military blockade targeting vessels entering and leaving Iranian ports, the Trump administration on Tuesday stepped up pressure with a financial offensive aimed at the banks and front-company networks that keep Iranian oil revenue moving.
In a post on X late Tuesday, the Treasury Department said it was “moving aggressively with Economic Fury, maintaining maximum pressure on Iran.”
The department warned that foreign financial institutions should be on notice, saying it is prepared to use “the full range of available tools and authorities” and is “prepared to deploy secondary sanctions against foreign financial institutions that continue to support Iran’s activities.”
This also puts greater pressure on jurisdictions that have quietly functioned as financial corridors for Iran’s sanctions-evasion networks.
Banks in the Persian Gulf, Hong Kong and China now face a stark choice: continue facilitating Iran-linked flows and risk losing access to the dollar system or cut those ties before Treasury acts.
That marks a significant escalation.
The maritime blockade was designed to squeeze Iran’s physical oil exports.
This new move targets the financial arteries behind them.
The money trail behind the shadow fleet
According to a Treasury letter shared with Al-Monitor, Washington has evidence that banks in the UAE, Oman, Hong Kong and China allowed Iranian funds linked to illicit activities to move through their systems.
This appears to be the first step toward imposing secondary sanctions, a measure that could cut those institutions off from the US financial system.
That would sharply raise the cost of doing business with Iran far beyond the tankers themselves.
The Treasury letter states that Iran processed at least $9 billion through US correspondent accounts in 2024 using front companies, especially in Hong Kong and the UAE and warned that similar activity continued after 2024.
For Tehran, this is potentially as serious as the naval pressure in Hormuz.
Even if cargoes still find ways to leave Iranian waters through spoofed AIS signals, ship-to-ship transfers or shadow fleet workarounds, the proceeds still need to land somewhere.
That is the vulnerability Washington now appears to be targeting.
The waiver clock is now ticking
Treasury also confirmed that the short-term authorization allowing the sale of Iranian oil already stranded at sea is set to expire in the coming days and “will not be renewed.”
Reuters separately reported the waiver will expire on April 19, tightening pressure on cargoes that had been temporarily allowed to move.
That creates a second countdown alongside the naval blockade.
The first clock is storage. The second is finance.
Cargoes that remain offshore may soon face not only delivery risk, but payment risk as well.
That could hit the shadow fleet where it hurts most: not whether it can move the oil, but whether anyone can safely pay for it.
This also puts greater pressure on jurisdictions that have quietly functioned as financial corridors for Iran’s sanctions-evasion networks.
Banks in the Persian Gulf, Hong Kong and China now face a stark choice: continue facilitating Iran-linked flows and risk losing access to the dollar system or cut those ties before Treasury acts.
War damage to Iran’s economy has reached $270 billion in 40 days, equivalent to roughly $3,000 per person, according to official figures, with losses expected to grow as trade disruptions deepen under a US blockade of Iranian ports.
Fatemeh Mohajerani, the spokesperson for the Iranian government, said on Tuesday losses from the US-Israeli military campaign are estimated at around $270 billion.
The New York Times, citing three Iranian officials and two economists, reported that early estimates broadly align with that figure, placing the damage at roughly $300 billion or higher.
Preliminary estimates by the US-based think tank Foundation for Defense of Democracies also suggest Iran absorbed roughly $150–$300 billion in economic damage.
Using a population of about 92 million, the lower estimate of $150 billion translates to roughly $1,600 per person, rising to nearly $3,250 per person under the higher estimate.
These figures reflect national wealth lost through destruction, halted production and disrupted trade.
Iran’s central bank has warned President Masoud Pezeshkian that rebuilding the country’s war-damaged economy could take more than a decade, sources familiar with internal deliberations told Iran International.
In a stark assessment delivered to the president in recent days, senior economic officials said the damage inflicted during the 40-day war with the United States and Israel—combined with Iran’s already fragile economic situation—could take up to 12 years to repair.
Industrial sectors bear largest losses
Petrochemicals account for the largest share of damage. Iran’s petrochemical sector, with annual sales of $29.1 billion, has seen about 85% of export capacity disrupted following strikes on major hubs including Mahshahr and South Pars. Estimated losses range from $30 billion to $50 billion.
Energy infrastructure has also been heavily affected. Refineries, storage depots and gas facilities have been struck, weakening a sector that generated about $78 billion in exports in 2024. Losses are estimated at $15 billion to $25 billion.
Explosion at Iran's Mahshahr petrochemical complex during US-Israeli strikes
Steel production, which underpins both industrial output and reconstruction, has been severely reduced, with about 70% of capacity disrupted. Losses are estimated at $5 billion to $10 billion.
Beyond physical losses, the war has triggered a sharp contraction in output.
Experts estimated a decline of more than 10% in GDP, equivalent to $34 billion to $44 billion in lost economic activity, affecting an economy that was already under strain before the conflict.
Beyond physical damage, policy-driven disruptions have compounded the losses.
Internet shutdown
A nationwide internet blackout beginning Feb. 28 has imposed additional costs.
Direct losses are estimated at $37 million to $42 million per day, totaling $1.5 billion to $2.5 billion over more than five weeks.
Afshin Kolahi, a member of Iran’s Chamber of Commerce, said Monday indirect losses could raise the daily figure to $70 million to $80 million due to disruption to online businesses.
Online sales fell by about 80% during the shutdown, while the Tehran Stock Exchange lost 450,000 points within four days.
The shutdown is affecting multiple layers of the economy simultaneously, according to economic analyst Masoumeh Taherkhani.
“The Iranian economy is damaged at three levels by internet disruption, starting with the digital core, which employs between four and five million people,” Taherkhani told Iran International. “Then the platform layer collapses, and finally the broader economy is affected in a way that spreads across production and services.”
Taherkhani said the combined effect leads to widespread job losses. “When the economy is fully stagnant, the outcome is unemployment for workers, and that is not something that can easily be reversed,” she said.
Trade disruption and self-inflicted losses
Disruptions linked to the Strait of Hormuz have added further pressure, with estimated losses of $5 billion to $15 billion.
The restrictions have affected imports of essential goods and weakened non-oil exports, contributing to supply chain disruptions across the economy.
A US naval blockade targeting Iran’s maritime trade routes is expected to deepen losses.
Sanctions strategist and former US Treasury official Miad Maleki estimated that cutting off seaborne trade could eliminate about $435 million in daily economic activity, equivalent to roughly $13 billion per month.
Iran relies on the Persian Gulf for more than 90% of its trade, leaving it highly exposed to sustained disruption.
Oil exports of about 1.5 million barrels per day – generating roughly $139 million daily – could be halted almost entirely, removing the country’s main source of foreign currency.
What the losses could have funded
The scale of damage corresponds to investment levels that could have reshaped core sectors of the economy.
A large combined-cycle power plant with capacity of around 1,000 to 1,500 megawatts typically costs between $600 million and $1 billion to build, depending on technology and fuel infrastructure.
At the lower estimate of $150 billion in losses, Iran could have financed roughly 150 to 250 such plants. At the upper estimate of $300 billion, that rises to between 300 and 500 plants, enough to eliminate electricity shortages and significantly expand export capacity.
In housing, average construction costs for a modest apartment unit range between $30,000 and $50,000. With $150 billion, between 3 million and 5 million housing units could have been built. At $300 billion, that increases to roughly 6 million to 10 million units, enough to address shortages across major urban areas.
High-speed rail construction typically costs between $20 million and $40 million per kilometer. The lower estimate of losses could have funded approximately 3,750 to 7,500 kilometers of rail, while the higher estimate could support up to 15,000 kilometers, connecting major cities nationwide.
A modern hospital costs between $200 million and $500 million to construct and equip. The lower-end losses could have built 300 to 750 hospitals, while the higher estimate could fund up to 1,500 facilities, expanding healthcare access across the country.
What it means for individual Iranians
The per capita loss of up to $3,250 represents a substantial share of annual income for many households.
With average monthly earnings between $150 and $200, an individual earns roughly $1,800 to $2,400 per year, meaning a $3,250 equivalent exceeds a full year of income for many citizens.
If such an amount were available, it could cover between 12 and 20 months of living expenses for an average worker. Families could use it toward housing costs, including down payments or completing home purchases in smaller cities.
Small businesses could be launched with startup capital of $2,000 to $5,000, enabling self-employment in sectors such as retail, services or online commerce. Households could also afford private healthcare, education or relocation costs that are otherwise beyond reach.
Even the lower estimate per person represents several months of income, providing a buffer against inflation, job loss or unexpected expenses.
The overall range reflects damage already incurred, with additional losses building as trade, production and financial flows remain disrupted.
At up to $3,250 per person and rising, the economic toll underscores the scale of damage to Iran’s productive capacity, with long-term implications for recovery and growth.
Sharp disagreements among members of Iran’s negotiating team led them to abandon US talks in Islamabad and return to Tehran on April 11 following an order from Iran's top security official, sources familiar with the deliberations told Iran International.
The sources said that during Friday’s negotiations with the United States, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi showed signs of flexibility in some of his positions, particularly regarding reducing or halting financial and military support for the so-called Axis of Resistance, including Lebanon’s Hezbollah.
According to the sources, this approach drew a strong reaction from Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, in Tehran.
The sources said Zolghadr, who was briefed on the talks, submitted a report to the leadership and senior IRGC commanders, which fueled anger at the highest levels. The report reportedly cited “deviation from the delegation’s mandate” and engagement in discussions beyond the leadership’s directives.
Following consultations at the leadership level, and with the involvement of Hossein Taeb, an advisor to the supreme leader, an order was issued on Saturday afternoon for the delegation’s immediate return to Tehran, the sources said.
Reports of similar internal rifts had surfaced earlier. On March 28, accounts emerged of serious disagreements between President Masoud Pezeshkian and IRGC Chief-Commander Ahmad Vahidi.
Informed sources told Iran International that the rifts stemmed from disagreements over the conduct of the war and its impact on livelihoods and the wider economy.
Three days later, reports indicated Pezeshkian was dissatisfied with being in a “complete political deadlock” and had even lost authority over appointing officials killed during the war.
According to those reports, Vahidi had said that due to wartime conditions, all key managerial positions should be directly controlled by the IRGC until further notice.
Iran’s insistence on continuing its nuclear program and maintaining control over the Strait of Hormuz ultimately contributed to the failure of the Islamabad talks, according to reports.
Following the breakdown, the United States announced a naval blockade targeting Iran’s southern ports, with US Central Command saying from Monday morning it would prevent ships from entering or leaving Iranian ports. The blockade was implemented as scheduled.
Despite the failure of the first round of talks, Pakistan said on Monday that consultations with both sides were ongoing and another round of talks remained possible.
US President Donald Trump also told the New York Post on Tuesday that talks with Iran “could resume within two days” in Pakistan.
Sources had earlier told Reuters that despite the apparent deadlock, diplomatic channels remain open, with an Iranian embassy official in Pakistan saying the next round of talks could take place later this week or early next week.
The idea that Iran could generate tens of billions of dollars annually by charging ships to pass through the Strait of Hormuz has gained traction in media commentary, but the claim does not withstand scrutiny.
Estimates circulating in public debate frequently suggest Iran could earn $40–100 billion annually by imposing transit fees on vessels using the strait, effectively turning the country into a “$100 billion gatekeeper” of global energy flows.
Yet a closer look at shipping volumes, pricing norms and international law suggests the potential revenues would likely be closer to $1–2 billion a year, even under optimistic assumptions.
According to the US Energy Information Administration, nearly 21 million barrels of oil per day passed through the strait in early 2025—around 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption and roughly a quarter of seaborne oil trade. About 20% of global LNG trade, largely from Qatar, also transits the waterway.
With petroleum cargo alone worth more than $500 billion annually, it is easy to see why the toll narrative is appealing.
Simple arithmetic of multiplying a hypothetical transit fee by daily vessel traffic quickly produces headline-grabbing estimates of tens of billions of dollars. But those calculations overlook how maritime transit actually works.
Legal and practical limits
Unlike the Suez Canal, the Strait of Hormuz is a natural waterway, not an engineered passage requiring dredging, infrastructure and navigation services.
The canal charges substantial transit fees partly because it is an artificial route requiring constant maintenance. Those fees typically range from about $200,000 to $700,000 per vessel.
Natural straits such as Hormuz operate under the transit passage regime established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which prohibits charging vessels simply for passage and requires non-discriminatory treatment.
Although Iran has not formally ratified the convention, these principles are widely recognized as customary international law. Oman, which shares jurisdiction over the strait and has ratified the treaty, has shown little willingness to support aggressive tolling policies.
Any unilateral attempt to impose large transit fees would likely trigger legal challenges and opposition from maritime powers and major energy importers.
The math behind the myth
Even ignoring legal constraints, realistic pricing benchmarks produce far smaller revenue estimates.
Applying Suez-style fee levels to Hormuz traffic dramatically reduces the numbers. Pre-conflict flows included roughly 10 very large crude carriers per day, alongside LNG and product tankers.
Using comparable Suez pricing (roughly $535,000 per tanker), and accounting for Oman’s jurisdictional share, Iran’s portion would likely amount to around $1.5 billion annually under ideal conditions.
And even that estimate assumes stable traffic, full compliance and minimal enforcement costs—conditions unlikely to hold if Tehran attempted to impose tariffs unilaterally.
In practice, traffic would likely fall as ships sought alternative routes or bypass pipelines such as Saudi Arabia’s East–West pipeline.
Geopolitical reality
The geopolitical constraints are equally significant.
The Strait of Hormuz is a critical energy lifeline for major economies including China, India, Japan and European states. Countries heavily dependent on Middle East energy supplies would be unlikely to accept large additional costs imposed unilaterally.
History offers a clear precedent. During the 1980s Tanker War, attacks on Persian Gulf shipping triggered international military intervention to secure maritime flows. Similar dynamics would likely emerge if transit fees were imposed on a large scale.
For Iran itself, the economic logic is also questionable. The country already struggles to monetize its oil exports because of sanctions and financial restrictions. Attempting to impose transit tariffs would likely intensify geopolitical pressure and reduce shipping volumes, offsetting much of the potential revenue.
The danger of the narrative
The biggest risk lies not in the policy itself but in the narrative surrounding it.
Inflated revenue estimates exaggerate Iran’s potential leverage over global energy markets. For Tehran, they may encourage overconfidence in the economic value of coercive maritime policies.
For external actors, they risk inflating the perceived threat and encouraging responses based on exaggerated assumptions.
The strategic value of the Strait of Hormuz lies not in its potential as a revenue-generating toll system, but in its role as a stable transit corridor for global energy flows.
The widely cited estimates are not supported by legal precedent, market behavior or geopolitical realities.
The “$100 billion gatekeeper” is not a viable strategy. It is a catchy headline for an economic illusion.
The United States moved to impose a naval blockade on Iran just as the country’s oil exports were surging to their highest levels in years, underscoring Washington’s effort to halt a wartime boom in Tehran’s energy revenues.
The move followed the collapse of negotiations in Pakistan and comes amid a war that has disrupted much of the Persian Gulf’s energy trade.
Since the launch of joint military operations by Israel and the United States, Iran has effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz. Even after the April 8 ceasefire, maritime traffic through the strategic waterway has yet to recover.
Data from the International Energy Agency show exports from Persian Gulf states have fallen sharply during the conflict, with more than 170 million barrels of their oil stranded in tankers anchored across the region, according to Kepler data.
Iran exports rise as others fall
At the same time, shipping data point to a striking countertrend: rising Iranian oil exports.
Despite the conflict, Iran has increased its daily oil loadings and exports to around 2 million barrels over the past three months.
China has raised its purchases of Iranian crude by more than 300,000 barrels per day, bringing total imports close to 1.6 million barrels daily. India, which halted Iranian oil imports in 2019, has also resumed purchases, receiving at least 2 million barrels this month.
Tehran has also opened discussions with Singapore, Taiwan, Japan and other Asian importers to expand its market share.
Reuters has reported that Iranian crude has recently been sold to some Chinese buyers at prices even higher than the Brent benchmark—an unusual development for a country that typically sells at a discount due to sanctions.
Windfall revenues
The World Bank estimates the economies of Kuwait, Qatar and Iraq, whose oil and LNG exports have been severely disrupted, could contract by between 5 and 9 percent this year.
Iran, by contrast, appears to be benefiting from both increased exports and a roughly 40 percent rise in global oil prices during the war.
Tehran has also begun collecting ad hoc transit fees from vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Ships are required to register with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and transit near Iranian islands.
Reports suggest Iran is charging up to $2 million per vessel. Under normal conditions, roughly 150 ships pass through the strait each day.
Blockade seeks to cut revenue
US President Donald Trump announced the naval blockade in an effort to halt Iranian oil exports while warning that vessels paying transit fees to Iran could face seizure.
Yet Iran appears to have prepared for disruption. Kpler estimates Tehran had already stockpiled roughly 200 million barrels of crude in Asian waters before the conflict began in late February, with an additional 23 million barrels stored in the Sea of Oman.
Those reserves could allow Iran to continue supplying customers for months even without new shipments.
Although Washington has threatened sanctions against buyers of Iranian oil, it remains unclear whether China—effectively Tehran’s main customer since 2019—will comply.
The conflict is also raising wider maritime risks across the region.
Iran has attacked around 20 vessels in its southern waters over the past 50 days, while incidents are spreading beyond the Gulf.
The UK Maritime Trade Operations agency reported on April 12 that armed individuals in a small boat attempted to approach a vessel in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, another vital energy chokepoint handling roughly 9.3 million barrels of oil and petroleum products each day.
Whether the US blockade will succeed in curbing Iran’s export surge—or further deepen disruption across global energy markets—remains uncertain.