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OPINION

Iran war cannot end with Revolutionary Guards still in control

Hossein Aghaie Joobani
Hossein Aghaie Joobani

Iran International

May 1, 2026, 22:05 GMT+1
Two members of the Revolutionary Guards are seen near a DShK machine gun stationed in a park in Tehran on April 18, 2026
Two members of the Revolutionary Guards are seen near a DShK machine gun stationed in a park in Tehran on April 18, 2026

Any settlement of the Iran war that leaves the Revolutionary Guards in control would preserve the Islamic Republic's core of power and risk turning a military advantage for the US and Israel into a strategic defeat.

That is the central challenge now facing Washington and its allies: how to end the conflict without giving the Islamic Republic time to absorb the blow, preserve the Revolutionary Guards’ grip on power and survive through another diplomatic compromise.

The war must conclude in a way that empowers the Iranian people, with support from outside players, namely the United States and Israel, and leaves them fully prepared to overthrow the IRGC-controlled regime. Any settlement or deal that ensures the Islamic Republic's survival would amount to a strategic defeat for the US and Israel.

In reality, the remnants of the regime still possess enough offensive capability to threaten the region and beyond. The US and Israel can use the most powerful and lethal force available against the Islamic Republic— the Iranian people — to eliminate the remaining threats once and for all.

To be sure, the people of Iran now face a fragmented leadership marked by serious rifts among political factions. The country’s economy is in ruins. The theocracy has sustained deep wounds and is effectively bleeding as a result of the elimination of top military commanders and political leaders.

The Islamic Republic is reportedly losing between $450 million and $500 million per day due to the US blockade of Hormuz. However, there is no guarantee that such economic losses will lead to its immediate collapse or overthrow. It may well resort to further violence and terrorist activity abroad.

Overall, the Islamic Republic is down, but it is not out. Sadly, more innocent people have been executed since an uneasy ceasefire took hold in mid-April.

This is simply because the core nucleus of power — the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps — remains functional. It has effectively engineered a silent coup under the cover of war, sidelining other contenders such as Ghalibaf, with whom Trump is reportedly seeking a possible framework to end the conflict.

The Trump administration and European powers should be mindful that no so-called reformist figure like Mikhail Gorbachev will emerge from within the Islamic Republic. From this regime, only terrorists emerge, wearing a mask of diplomatic civility.

Israel, whether one agrees with it or not, has a strong understanding of Tehran's modus operandi, largely because it has developed extensive expertise in countering terrorist networks, many of which are supported or enabled by the radicals in Tehran.

In this view, the world should recognize that the disintegration of the IRGC cannot be achieved through negotiation or a maritime blockade alone. Such an outcome requires a hybrid strategy centered on maximum economic pressure, sustained military pressure and the empowerment of the Iranian people to topple the clerical rule.

If decision-makers in Tehran conclude that the United States ultimately wants to avoid continued conflict, they may be incentivized to prolong the confrontation in a more attritional form, using stalling tactics and deception to buy time. In parallel, they could gradually escalate tensions below the threshold of an all-out war in an effort to extract concessions, particularly if they believe the US is seeking to end the conflict without committing to regime change.

The key, therefore, is to deprive the Islamic Republic of the notion that Trump seeks an off-ramp in this war and instead shift toward sustained pressure so that the IRGC faces only two options: total surrender or regime change.

I argue that the IRGC will not fully acquiesce to US conditions. Instead, it may accept certain demands while rejecting others in order to prolong the conflict and extend the diplomatic process.

The best way to neutralize the threats posed by the IRGC regime in Tehran is to take the following considerations into account:

  • Expand pressure on the Islamic Republic's third tier of current and former leaders, including figures such as Ghalibaf, Rouhani, Zarif and Khatami.
  • Seize Iran’s buried uranium stockpile before it is too late.
  • Maintain the maritime blockade and expand it to other areas, including the Indo-Pacific, with the aim of cutting off Tehran's financial lifeline.
  • Provide Israel with greater latitude for targeted operations against IRGC and Basij commanders and lower-level security forces.
  • Directly enable people inside Iran through intelligence assets and logistical support so they can seize the Islamic Republic’s strategic institutions themselves.
  • Engage with Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi in a manner reminiscent of Reagan’s outreach to Sakharov, fostering dialogue with the most consequential Iranian opposition leader, backed by a vast number of people inside Iran.

In sum, the conflict involving the US and the IRGC should be resolved in a way that fundamentally weakens the current regime and increases the agency of the Iranian population.

Any negotiated settlement that allows the Islamic Republic to remain intact would be a strategic setback for the United States and Israel. The US and Israel have the people of Iran as the most powerful force against the regime in Tehran.

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Trump and Tehran are betting on who breaks first, NYT columnist says

May 1, 2026, 10:24 GMT+1

The Iran war shows how smaller powers can still disrupt much stronger militaries and economies through cheap drones, cyber tools and chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman argued in an opinion piece.

Friedman wrote that President Donald Trump is betting the US blockade of Iranian oil exports will force Tehran to negotiate on Washington’s terms, while Iran is betting that pressure on the Strait of Hormuz and higher energy prices will eventually force Trump to retreat.

The columnist argued that the larger lesson is not only about Iran, but about the changing nature of power. He said the war has shown how asymmetric warfare has evolved, allowing states and armed groups to use relatively cheap tools to create major disruption.

Friedman cited Iran’s use of low-cost drones to strike Amazon Web Services data centers in the UAE and Bahrain, saying the attacks caused far larger economic and service disruption than the price of the weapons would suggest. He also compared Iran’s tactics to Ukraine’s drone attacks inside Russia and Hamas’s use of improvised rockets against Israel.

He said the next stage could be even more dangerous as artificial intelligence gives smaller states, militant groups and hackers access to far more powerful tools. Friedman warned that AI agents could make cyberattacks cheaper, faster and more autonomous, giving actors that once had few options new ways to threaten advanced societies.

The argument, he wrote, is that Trump may be misreading the conflict if he assumes Iran has “no cards.” In Friedman’s view, the war is a preview of a world where even weakened states can use drones, cyber capabilities, infrastructure attacks and AI to create what one expert called “mass disruption.”

Economics may decide outcome of Iran-US standoff

Apr 30, 2026, 22:31 GMT+1
•
Behrouz Turani

The next phase of the Iran–US standoff may be decided not on the battlefield, but by how much economic pressure each side can withstand.

What remains unclear is how that pressure will play out. Will rising fuel prices and market instability in the United States push President Donald Trump toward compromise, or will Iran’s mounting economic strain force Tehran to accept US demands?

"Iran's economy is a disaster. So we'll see how long they hold out," Trump told reporters on Thursday.

In both Iran and the US, political messaging already points toward eventual claims of victory. For ordinary Iranians, however, the only positive outcome is one where their livelihood improves.

Ali Asghar Zargar, a political science professor in Tehran, describes the current moment as “as dangerous as the war itself.” Speaking to the reform-leaning Fararu website, he warned that “when diplomacy collapses, the likelihood of military action increases.”

Still, he noted that despite the lack of progress, “the path to dialogue has not been completely closed.”

Zargar characterized the current state of half-active diplomacy as a safety valve slowing the slide toward open conflict. But he cautioned that “an error on either side can trigger a clash at any moment,” pointing to the volatility of the situation in the Strait of Hormuz.

The two-week ceasefire between Tehran and Washington expired last week, with no clear indication that talks will resume soon.

Iranian diplomatic activity, particularly Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s recent visits to Pakistan, Oman and Russia, has fueled speculation about both renewed negotiations and the possibility of further escalation.

Some Iranian analysts believe another round of US and Israeli strikes cannot be ruled out.

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said on Thursday that Iran has suffered “very severe blows” over the past year and warned that further action may be needed “to ensure the achievement of our goals.”

Also on Thursday, Iran’s parliament speaker and lead negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said Tehran could use its position over the Strait of Hormuz to reshape regional dynamics and reduce US influence.

“Iran, by exercising control over the Strait of Hormuz, will ensure that it and its neighbors enjoy the precious blessing of a future free from the presence and interference of America,” he wrote on X.

Abbas Abdi, a reformist commentator who had largely avoided domestic political writing in recent months, returned this week with a stark assessment: “We are in an exceptional situation where everything is about survival.”

He argued that Iran needs a new framework that prioritizes ending the war above all else.

The economic cost of the standoff is already significant on both sides. Opposition to the war and its financial consequences has grown in the United States, while Trump has claimed Iran is “losing $500 million a day” under the U.S. blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

As Tehran and Washington test each other’s resilience, distrust continues to deepen. A Fararu analysis described the situation as one of “active suspension”: relations are neither moving toward full confrontation nor showing any clear path to agreement.

For now, both sides appear to be probing how much pressure the other can endure without breaking. But the longer that calculation continues, the greater the risk that economic strain—and a single misstep—could tip the balance toward escalation rather than compromise.

US forms new coalition to secure Hormuz, asks partners to join

Apr 30, 2026, 17:50 GMT+1

The United States has asked partner countries to join its newly formed Maritime Freedom Coalition to help secure passage through the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf waterways, according to a State Department cable.

The cable, sent this week to US diplomatic posts around the world, instructed diplomats to announce the coalition and “ask for partner participation” by Friday.

It also told diplomats not to discuss the initiative with “US adversaries, including Russia, China, Belarus, and Cuba.”

According to the cable, which was first reported by the Wall Street Journal, the coalition will be led by the State and Defense Departments through US Central Command.

“The MFC will take steps to ensure safe passage, including providing real-time information, safety guidance, and coordination to ensure vessels can transit these waters securely,” the cable said.

President Donald Trump has on several occasions criticized NATO allies and European countries for not doing enough to help the United States reopen and secure the Strait of Hormuz which has been effectively closed after the Iran war.

US blockade

The US initiative comes as Washington has imposed a naval blockade on Iranian ports since April 13, sharply reducing Iran’s oil exports and intensifying pressure on Tehran’s access to maritime trade routes.

Iranian crude shipments that successfully moved out of the Gulf of Oman fell to about four million barrels between April 13 and April 25, Reuters reported, citing oil analytics firm Vortexa.

That was down more than 80% from a comparable period in March, when Iran exported 23.4 million barrels, according to LSEG data cited by Reuters.

Reuters said only a handful of tankers carrying Iranian crude left the Gulf of Oman during that period.

Some Iranian vessels have turned off tracking systems, while US forces have turned back Iranian tankers, making it impossible to determine how much crude Iran is still delivering to customers, particularly China.

As Tehran praises Moscow, critics ask where Russia was

Apr 29, 2026, 21:21 GMT+1
•
Maryam Sinaiee

As Iranian officials continue to tout a “strategic partnership” with Russia, rare public criticism has emerged over Moscow’s muted response to the recent war.

In interviews with the reformist Shargh daily and the ILNA news agency, Nematollah Izadi, Iran’s first ambassador to the Russian Federation, openly criticized what he described as Russia’s inaction.

“Moscow will inevitably have to answer to history for this silence,” he told Shargh.

In comments to ILNA, Izadi said Russia had the capacity to do more and may even have been able to help prevent the war.

“Unfortunately, in my view, the Russians were not as active in this war as they should have been, even though they have—and had—the capacity to act and possibly even take measures to prevent the war,” he said.

Izadi suggested Moscow’s restrained response may have been shaped by self-interest. He cited higher oil revenues following the easing of US sanctions on Iran, the diversion of global attention from the war in Ukraine and the depletion of NATO military resources.

“It is unacceptable that a war of this scale occurs in Russia’s neighborhood, involving a country like Iran, and that the Russians, for whatever reason—even focusing on Ukraine, oil sales, or any other reason—show no reaction and do not support Tehran,” he said.

'Strategic partnership'

The remarks stand in contrast to official messaging in Tehran.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi traveled to Russia this week and met President Vladimir Putin, describing ties between the two countries as “a strategic partnership at the highest level.”

He said the purpose of the trip was to exchange views on recent developments and reaffirm Tehran’s view of the relationship as strategic.

Putin said Moscow would do whatever it could to assist Iran and noted he had received a message from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei the previous week.

The Kremlin later said Putin had discussed the Iran ceasefire in a phone call with US President Donald Trump and supported extending it to allow room for negotiations.

Russia has officially condemned US and Israeli attacks on Iran as “unprovoked armed aggression” and “a betrayal of diplomacy.” But beyond rhetoric, Moscow has not provided direct military support such as weapons or air-defense systems, nor has it launched a major diplomatic initiative to resolve the crisis.

'Positive track record'

Western media and organizations including the Foundation for Defense of Democracies have claimed Russia may have provided Iran with satellite intelligence or access to captured US missile technology for reverse engineering.

Iran’s ambassador to Moscow, Kazem Jalali, has denied any Russian military or intelligence assistance during the conflict.

Another dimension of Iran-Russia cooperation involves nuclear diplomacy. Rafael Grossi told the Associated Press that discussions have taken place with Russia and other parties on the possible removal of Iran’s highly enriched uranium from the country.

Russia has repeatedly offered to store Iran’s enriched uranium. Alexey Likhachev, head of Russia’s state nuclear corporation, described Russia as “the only country with a positive track record of cooperation with Iran” and said Moscow was ready to facilitate such a transfer, though Tehran has so far shown little interest.

That has sharpened questions in Iran over the practical limits of the relationship.

The S-400 question

Despite a 20-year strategic partnership agreement signed in 2025, the pact includes no mutual defense obligations in the event of an attack.

Meanwhile, promised military cooperation appears limited. A senior Revolutionary Guard official said in January 2025 that Iran had ordered Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets from Russia, but no verified reports of their delivery have emerged.

Criticism of Russia has also spread on Iranian social media, particularly among users opposed to the Islamic Republic, with many mocking what they see as rhetorical support unaccompanied by meaningful action, such as the non-delivery of advanced systems like the S-400 or Su-35 jets.

For all the talk of strategic partnership, the recent war appears to have exposed the gap between Tehran’s expectations and Moscow’s priorities—fueling skepticism both among officials and across Iranian social media.

US talks trigger unprecedented rift in Iran’s hardline camp

Apr 28, 2026, 21:12 GMT+1
•
Maryam Sinaiee

A widening split over how to deal with the United States has reached the deepest layers of Iran’s hardline establishment, surfacing in state-linked media and among factions that have long presented a united front under the banner of revolutionary loyalty.

The divide became unusually public this week as several ultraconservative MPs refused to sign a letter backing Iran’s negotiating team. The dispute then spilled into hardline media, triggering an unprecedented public clash between Raja News and the Revolutionary Guards-linked Tasnim News Agency.

The confrontation largely pits supporters of former nuclear negotiator and National Security Council member Saeed Jalili against allies of his longtime rival, parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who recently led Iran’s delegation in talks in Islamabad.

On Monday, Iranian media reported that 27 members of parliament—including seven affiliated with Jalili’s ultraconservative camp—refused to sign a letter backing the negotiating team and Ghalibaf’s leadership in the Islamabad talks.

One of them, Mahmoud Nabavian, who had traveled to Islamabad with the delegation, later claimed that Mojtaba Khamenei’s “red lines” had been violated. He alleged that negotiators had engaged with the United States on nuclear issues against those guidelines.

In recent days, hardline lawmakers and commentators have increasingly criticized the negotiating team.

Jalili himself appeared to escalate tensions when he called on Mojtaba Khamenei to clarify publicly whether ongoing actions reflected his directives. In a now-deleted post, he wrote that if no such message was issued, “there is one hundred percent a ‘sedition of officials,’ and all these statements are written by the coup plotter himself.”

The remark was widely seen as aimed at Ghalibaf.

The feud escalated further after a Tasnim editorial said demanding the United States lift all sanctions or agree to a comprehensive ceasefire with Iran’s armed allies in the region amounted to unrealistic expectations like a “magic beanstalk.”

The article also argued that negotiations with the United States should not be seen as a final solution and that “the power of the people in the streets” could serve as Iran’s main leverage.

Raja News published a harsh response.

Tasnim later removed the article, saying it had republished it from another outlet, but responded in an unusually sharp tone, accusing Raja of inciting division and acting against national security.

It said the outlet was “seeking to complete Trump’s project in Iran” and noted that some individuals had recently been arrested over “suspicious movements to undermine sacred unity.”

A Telegram post by Saberin News, a channel linked to security institutions, went further, labeling the Paydari Party as the Kharijites—a historical term for extremist dissenters who opposed and ultimately assassinated Imam Ali, the first Shia imam.

The post accused them of “sowing division on the battlefield” and “playing in favor of Israel and the United States.”

Iran’s state broadcaster (IRIB) has also come under scrutiny for alleged bias. Its deputy for cultural affairs, Vahid Jalili, is Saeed Jalili’s brother.

Moderate outlet Khabar Online reported that by its count, 8 out of 10 of pundits appearing on IRIB during the recent conflict have been conservatives, with 15 percent linked to the ultraconservative Paydari Front.

“The problem is not just the elimination of reformists; the data shows that even moderate conservatives or critical insiders have almost no presence in these programs,” the outlet wrote.

Raja News later said it would avoid prolonging the dispute in public and would instead pursue legal action. But as the stakes rise—whether through renewed talks with Washington or a return to war—it may prove difficult to put the genie back in the bottle.