Calls for secrecy in Tehran reflect divisions over US talks

After a 40-day war, Iran and the United States returned to the negotiating table in Islamabad for 21 hours of high-level talks that ended without agreement. A day later, US President Donald Trump announced a naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and Tehran said it would not negotiate under threat.

What the Islamabad talks made clear is that mistrust is not a single obstacle but a three-layered structure.

The first layer is structural, rooted in conflicting historical narratives and incompatible visions of the future. The second is tactical, visible in disputes over agenda, sequencing and guarantees. The third—and perhaps most acute in current circumstances—is mistrust in the negotiating teams themselves, both across the table and within each country’s political establishment.

Understanding these layers is essential to any realistic assessment of whether negotiations can succeed.

Structural mistrust

Washington often traces the hostility to the 1979 seizure of the US embassy in Tehran and the anti-American ideology that followed, from chants of “Death to America” to attacks by Iran-backed armed groups across the region.

Tehran begins its story in 1953, when the US and Britain backed the coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh. Iranian officials portray Washington as a colonial power bent on undermining Iran’s sovereignty and independence.

Successive conflicts have deepened these narratives: the eight-year Iran-Iraq war, last year’s 12-day war, and now a 40-day conflict with the United States.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi recently summed up the mood when he said hostility would endure “as long as America is America and the Islamic Republic is the Islamic Republic.”

In such an environment, diplomatic gestures are easily interpreted as tactical deception rather than genuine attempts at compromise. Compounding the problem is the absence of any shared vision for a post-war settlement.

Trump speaks of a “big deal” but has not clearly defined what that means in diplomatic or regional security terms. Tehran speaks of ending the war “with victory” without clarifying whether that means restoring the status quo or securing recognition of its regional role.

Negotiation without a shared end state is less a path to resolution than a continuation of war by other means.

This is one reason the 2015 nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, proved fragile: both sides treated it as a temporary management tool, not a new beginning.

Tactical mistrust

Hardline Iranian lawmaker Mahmoud Nabavian, who was reportedly involved in the Islamabad talks, called the inclusion of the nuclear issue a “strategic mistake,” arguing it encouraged US demands such as removing nuclear material from Iran or suspending enrichment for decades.

Yet Washington has repeatedly framed the core issue as preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Trump has at times spoken of dismantling Iran’s nuclear infrastructure entirely.

Even third parties have hinted at confusion. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has suggested both sides have issues to discuss, but no agreed text or framework yet exists.

Tehran reportedly presented a 10-point proposal to end the war. According to Axios, Washington responded with a three-page counterproposal.

What is described publicly as negotiation often looks more like two parallel monologues.

Another unresolved question is sequencing. Iran says it will not negotiate under threat and has demanded an end to the naval blockade as a precondition. Washington expects Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and present a unified proposal.

When Trump extended a ceasefire on April 21, he said it would last only until Iran’s leaders and representatives could produce “a unified proposal.” In Tehran, such language was interpreted less as an invitation to talks than as coercion.

Mistrust in negotiators

Layered on top of these disputes is growing mistrust in the negotiators themselves.

Many in Tehran doubt whether the US side has the authority to deliver. Mohammad-Amin Imanjani, editor of the hardline Iranian newspaper Farhikhtegan, dismissed Trump’s envoys as lacking sufficient understanding of Iran and failing to properly convey Tehran’s demands.

Iranian state media has echoed such doubts, particularly regarding the role and authority of US intermediaries.

For Washington, the issue is both Tehran’s authority to deliver and the belief that it is not negotiating with one voice.

The result was visible in the rhetoric after Islamabad. As he left the city, US Vice President JD Vance reportedly said Washington had presented its “best and final” offer and that walking away would hurt Iran more than America.

Iranian parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf responded by accusing Washington of failing to earn Tehran’s trust. The two narratives barely intersect.

Is a deal still possible?

Negotiations built on three layers of mistrust are unlikely to produce more than temporary arrangements. To make progress, both sides would first need to restore confidence in the process itself.

But the deeper obstacle may remain unchanged: both sides appear to believe they still have more to gain through pressure than compromise.

Washington may calculate that military and economic pressure has not yet reached breaking point. Tehran may believe it has demonstrated enough resilience to extract concessions from a position of strength.

As long as both see escalation as more rewarding than accommodation, diplomacy will struggle.

The danger is that the conflict may not spiral through one dramatic rupture, but through a series of smaller decisions—each rational in isolation—that move both sides further from any durable agreement.

In Tehran, Abbas Araghchi’s whirlwind regional tour is being presented as evidence that Iran still has diplomatic options and regional leverage.

But behind the official narrative, even Iranian media and senior officials are beginning to acknowledge a harsher reality: talks with Washington are stalled, allies are limited and the country’s room to maneuver is narrowing.

The reformist daily Shargh wrote on Monday that the visits revealed “clear signs of a deadlock in negotiations with Washington.”

In an interview with ISNA, Araghchi himself acknowledged that “the first round of talks in Islamabad failed to reach its objectives,” blaming what he described as “the United States’ excessive demands.”

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But behind the official narrative, even Iranian media and senior officials are beginning to acknowledge a harsher reality: talks with Washington are stalled, allies are limited and the country’s room to maneuver is narrowing.

The reformist daily Shargh wrote on Monday that the visits revealed “clear signs of a deadlock in negotiations with Washington.”

In an interview with ISNA, Araghchi himself acknowledged that “the first round of talks in Islamabad failed to reach its objectives,” blaming what he described as “the United States’ excessive demands.”

Media in Tehran have portrayed Araghchi’s visits to Pakistan, Oman and Russia as part of an effort to break the impasse with Washington through regional diplomacy.

But leaks in US media suggest Tehran’s message remains uncompromising: end the US blockade of the Strait of Hormuz as a precondition for immediate talks on Iran’s nuclear program.

That demand underscores the gap between Tehran’s public message of diplomacy and the harder line it may still be taking behind closed doors.

The idea that Tehran can quickly repair relations with neighboring states also appears optimistic. Regional capitals still vividly remember Iran’s recent strikes on the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.

While Tehran insists diplomatic channels remain open, only a handful of neighbors appear willing—or able—to engage.

Oman, traditionally a trusted mediator, may have less incentive to play that role after Tehran’s recent actions and amid Washington’s hesitation. Russia, meanwhile, is increasingly viewed with suspicion inside Iran, where critics accuse Moscow of exploiting Tehran’s isolation without offering meaningful support.

Yet despite the impasse, signs of a possible diplomatic opening remain.

Pakistan’s active mediation has positioned Islamabad as an important hub for indirect US-Iran communication, suggesting both sides still see value in keeping channels open.

In Washington, President Donald Trump’s recent references to an “agreement in principle,” including possible limits on uranium enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief, suggest discussions may have moved from whether to talk toward what terms might be acceptable.

Economic pressure is also pushing both sides toward pragmatism.

In Iran, the economy is buckling under war, inflation and disruption to oil exports. In the United States, rising gasoline prices are creating domestic political pressure.

The so-called pragmatists in Tehran appear increasingly willing to pursue compromise to preserve stability. Hardliners, especially among a younger generation of officials, increasingly frame the conflict as existential and may see concessions as surrender.

If they conclude Washington’s ultimate goal is regime change rather than policy change, pressure could grow for nuclear escalation rather than restraint.

Washington’s insistence that Iran halt all uranium enrichment and remove previously enriched material remains a central sticking point. The Strait of Hormuz is another.

The United States has reportedly conditioned any pause in military action on the complete and safe reopening of the waterway. Any renewed Iranian interference with shipping could trigger immediate retaliation and collapse diplomacy.

Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear or leadership targets—or retaliatory actions by Hezbollah or the Houthis—could drag both Tehran and Washington into a cycle neither fully controls.

For now, the immediate question is no longer whether Washington and Tehran are talking. It is whether either side is prepared to soften their demands before events overtake diplomacy.

And in Tehran, where the costs of war are rising by the day, that question is becoming harder to ignore.

At a Security Council debate on maritime security, the U.S. envoy accused Tehran of holding the global economy “hostage,” while Iran’s envoy denounced Washington as “pirates and terrorists” for targeting commercial vessels.

“The world’s critical waterways are not bargaining chips that belong to any one country,” U.S. envoy Dorothy Shea told the council.

She said Iran was using the strait “like its own moat and drawbridge” and accused Tehran of laying sea mines, firing on civilian ships and threatening to charge tolls to allow vessels through.

Iran’s ambassador to the UN, Amir Saeid Iravani, rejected the accusations and said the United States was “acting like pirates and terrorists” by targeting commercial vessels through “coercion and intimidation,” terrorizing crews, seizing ships and “taking crew members hostage.”

He said countries condemning Iran over the strait “do not dare” criticize Washington’s actions and insisted Tehran’s measures were “grounded in its rights and obligations under the law of the sea and its national laws.”

The Strait of Hormuz, which links the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, typically handles around 20% of the world’s daily oil and liquefied natural gas supplies.

Before the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran began on February 28, between 125 and 140 ships passed through the strait each day. In the past 24 hours, only seven vessels have done so, according to ship-tracking data.

Iran closed the strait after the start of U.S. and Israeli military operations against the Islamic Republic and launched attacks on Arab Gulf states, prompting Washington to begin enforcing a naval blockade on Iran-related shipping.

Hundreds of ships and an estimated 20,000 seafarers remain stranded inside the Gulf, according to maritime analysts.

UN Secretary-General António Guterres appealed directly to the parties to restore maritime traffic.

“Open the strait,” he said, “let ships pass, no tolls, no discrimination, let trade resume, let the global economy breathe.”

Arsenio Dominguez, secretary-general of the International Maritime Organization, also weighed in, saying Iran could neither legally close the strait nor impose fees on vessels using it.

“There is no legal basis for any country to introduce payments, tolls, fees or discriminatory conditions on international straits,” he told the council.

Dominguez warned that crews were under “significant risks and considerable psychological strain” and said the longer the crisis continues, “the greater the risk of serious accidents, including environmental accidents.”

The meeting, chaired by Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, was convened following internal assessments and intelligence reports warning of potential unrest in the coming days, the sources said.

According to information presented at the meeting, officials believe mounting economic hardship—driven by rising prices, unemployment, and damage to key industries such as petrochemicals and steel—could become the main trigger for renewed protests.

Security agencies reportedly presented a highly critical picture of Iran’s economy, highlighting widespread job losses linked to the shutdown of industrial units in the oil, petrochemical, and steel sectors, as well as the impact of prolonged internet disruptions.

Estimates shared during the meeting suggested that Iran’s economy may not be able to withstand more than six to eight weeks of a naval blockade. The blockade began on April 13, and around two weeks have now passed.

Another major concern raised was the near-total shutdown of production centers in key sectors, including oil, petrochemicals, and steel. According to the assessments, rebuilding these industries could take years.

Security officials also said internet shutdowns have left around 20% of the workforce dependent on online activity unemployed. They warned that, based on economic forecasts, an additional two million people could lose their jobs in the private sector by the end of spring.

In the financial sector, the closure of markets—including banks, the stock exchange, gold markets, and currency exchanges—has effectively halted economic activity, leaving real prices for goods unclear.

During the meeting, representatives of security bodies expressed particular concern over a possible call for protests by exiled Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi and the likelihood of his supporters taking to the streets.

Renewed protests inevitable

According to sources familiar with the meeting, security agencies concluded that public protests are inevitable, with the only uncertainty being the timing of their outbreak.

Calls for protests around International Workers’ Day have further heightened concerns among officials and were discussed during the council meeting.

Workers, retirees, teachers, and other wage-earning groups have repeatedly staged protests or issued statements over living conditions, delayed payments, job insecurity, and the suppression of independent labor organizations.

Ahead of International Workers’ Day, labor groups inside and outside Iran have again emphasized demands including wage increases, the release of detained labor activists, the repeal of repressive rulings, and the right to form independent unions.

Sources said members of the Supreme National Security Council believe that protests occurring during ongoing talks with the United States or following an extension of the ceasefire could pose a real risk to the survival of the Islamic Republic.

Iran has experienced several waves of protests, strikes, and civil disobedience in recent years, often driven by economic hardship, inflation, and widespread dissatisfaction with living conditions.

Authorities have responded with widespread internet disruptions, communication restrictions, deployment of security forces, and, in some cases, violent crackdowns.

The most brutal crackdown came on January 8 and 9, when at least 36,500 people were killed after millions of protesters held rallies across the country following a call by Pahlavi.