Fear of fun: what Halloween ban reveals about culture and control in Iran

Ayandeh survived on illusion—paying old investors with new deposits while building an empire of glass and marble called Iran Mall.

Earlier this week, Iran’s Central Bank ordered its liquidation into the state-owned Bank Melli, the country’s largest financial institution.

Built on sand

Founded in 2010 by businessman Ali Ansari, Ayandeh emerged from the merger of his Bank Tat with several smaller institutions.

Within a few years, it shook up Iran’s banking sector by offering interest rates roughly four percentage points higher than those allowed by the Money and Credit Council.

The strategy drew millions of depositors and rapidly expanded its market share; by 2017, Ayandeh held 7.6 percent of all deposits in Iran’s banking system. Beneath that success lay a web of risky loans and inflated promises.

By 2020, the bank’s fortunes had reversed, and calls for its liquidation began. When it was finally folded into Bank Melli, the savings of seven million depositors were trapped in bad loans and speculative ventures.

Much like a Ponzi scheme, Ayandeh relied on a steady inflow of new deposits to pay earlier investors while channeling enormous sums into illiquid assets—mostly real estate.

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Biggest Gamble: Iran Mall

Experts trace Ayandeh’s downfall to its massive exposure to real estate, especially the Iran Mall—a colossal shopping and leisure complex west of Tehran (1.95 million square meters) developed and owned by Ansari himself.

Investigations showed that roughly 70 percent of Ayandeh’s lending went to the Iran Mall Development Company, a subsidiary fully owned by the bank.

The loans exceeded the legal limit for a single borrower by more than a thousandfold—blatant self-dealing that violated banking laws capping ownership of any single shareholder at 10 percent, or 30 percent with Central Bank approval.

Ayandeh’s executives effectively lent billions to themselves, betting that post-nuclear-deal optimism and foreign investment would transform Iran Mall into a profit engine.

But after the US withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, Iran’s economy contracted, purchasing power plunged, and foreign brands stayed away. What was meant as a monument to modern commerce became a mausoleum of financial hubris and cronyism.

Shielded by Power

Ansari, now 63, began building his empire in his twenties, founding Bank Tat in 2009 with a capital base of 2 trillion rials (about $200 million at the time) before merging it with other institutions to form Ayandeh.

Beyond Iran Mall, he owned several luxury properties, including a Tehran tower sold to convicted tycoon Babak Zanjani, who paid only one-fifth of the price.

After Ayandeh’s dissolution, Ansari claimed his “conscience is clear,” though he has faced no legal proceedings.

Rumors persist of political protection, including alleged ties to Mojtaba Khamenei, the Supreme Leader’s son, and Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel, Mojtaba’s father-in-law.

These remain unverified but reinforce perceptions that Ayandeh’s rise and fal were inseparable from Iran’s political elite.

‘People pay the price’

By the time the Central Bank dissolved Ayandeh, the bank was 550 quadrillion rials (roughly $5.1 billion) in debt.

If its real-estate assets—including Iran Mall—cannot be sold to cover liabilities, the Central Bank will have to print money to repay depositors, injecting vast sums into the economy—a “pure inflationary disaster,” as the financial outlet Bourse Press warned.

Officials have pledged that major shareholders will be held accountable and small depositors repaid first, but skepticism abounds.

Economist Ali Sarzaeem argued that the Central Bank long knew the scale of Ayandeh’s abuses but lacked the will to act.

“If the bank’s assets are overvalued or unsellable,” he wrote, “the gap between debt and equity will again be filled from the pockets of ordinary Iranians.”

The moderate-conservative Jomhuri Eslami painted an even bleaker picture: “Even more tragic is that this infection has been passed on to Bank Melli—and that bank too will sooner or later meet the same fate.”

Under a new law Iranians will be able to enter their details on a Foreign Ministry’s portal called Porseman to check whether they are “problem-free” to travel to Iran, top envoy Abbas Araghchi said according to state media.

Those cleared receive a green tick indicating they have no outstanding legal or security issues. Araghchi went further, saying that if a person with a green tick is arrested, “those who arrested them will be prosecuted.”

He described the plan as part of an effort to “decriminalize the mindset” of Iranians abroad and encourage smoother travel home.

The statement immediately drew ridicule online.

Iranian journalist Hossein Bastani wrote on X that the idea was absurd, asking where the Foreign Ministry could “take action” against more powerful armed organs of state power like the Intelligence Ministry or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Competing state bodies staffed variously by clerics, security men, spies and conservative bureaucrats vie hotly for influence in the Islamic theocracy.

US diplomats have frequently criticized the foreign ministry as beholden to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the IRGC.

Authorities are not the authorities

Analysts interviewed by Iran International said the Porseman portal may be subject to the vagaries of Iran's divided system.

Patrick Clawson, director at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said the initiative ignores the fundamental problem: that “the authorities are not the authorities.”

Different agencies in Iran, he said, often act without coordination or oversight, meaning a traveler could be cleared by one branch of government and still detained by another.

That lack of hierarchy, Clawson added, has long frustrated both diplomats and negotiators dealing with Tehran.

“You could have eight agencies saying you’re fine,” he said, “and the ninth one arrests you.” Clawson dismissed Araghchi’s claim of prosecuting the Revolutionary Guard as political theater, calling it another example of how little power the foreign minister actually holds in Iran’s decision-making structure.

'No green tick will protect you'

Alex Vatanka, head of the Iran Program at the Middle East Institute, said the Islamic Republic has spent years trying to convince Iranians abroad to visit and invest, but trust is almost nonexistent. The foreign ministry can make assurances, he said, but “if another branch of the system decides you’re a target, no green tick will protect you.”

That fear is not unfounded. Lebanese academic Nizar Zakka and Australian researcher Kylie Moore-Gilbert, who both described their ordeals in interviews with Iran International's podcast Eye for Iran— were invited to Iran by senior officials for conferences and academic exchanges, only to be later arrested and imprisoned on spurious charges.

Their cases remain emblematic of how one arm of the state can extend invitations while another turns those same visitors into hostages.

Vatanka believes the initiative stems from desperation to attract tourism and foreign currency as Iran’s economy falters.

“They look at Turkey, the UAE, even Saudi Arabia making billions from tourism, while Iran—with all its history and culture—gets almost nothing,” he said.

“But Iran treats people as currency. Hostage-taking has been part of its political toolbox since 1979, and that’s not something a website can fix.”

Former US diplomat Alan Eyre said the timing of the Porseman rollout also reflects President Masoud Pezeshkian’s attempt to project normalcy after a bruising year marked by snapback sanctions, a 12-day war, and deepening isolation.

“They’re trying to show Iran is open for tourism and investment,” Eyre told Iran International, “but the executive branch is weak and can’t control the security forces that actually run things.”

Eyre said the effort fits a familiar pattern: after international crises, the clerical establishment launches cosmetic outreach to soften its image abroad. But, he added, “beneath that surface message of safety, you still have a system that arrests its own citizens and uses them as bargaining chips.”

The US State Department has long advised US citizens not to travel to Iran, citing risks of arbitrary arrest, detention, and hostage-taking, and the current Level 4 “Do Not Travel” advisory remains in place.

For now, Porseman offers reassurance only on paper. In practice, the same system that issues a green tick cannot resolve the uncertainty that defines travel to Iran — a country where returning home still carries unpredictable risk.

Meysam Gholami, acting head of the state-run Research Institute of Cyberspace told a national cyber conference that an opinion poll found 2.4% of respondents were “very satisfied” and 17% “somewhat satisfied” with internet in Iran.

By contrast, 41% said they were “not very satisfied” and 38% “not satisfied at all,” with 2% declining to answer, according to remarks carried by Iranian media.

Gholami said about 61% of users reported using free VPNs and circumvention tools. He added that 10% keep VPNs “almost always” on, 53% switch them on for specific tasks, and 14% said they do not use VPNs.

He warned that widespread use of no-cost tools can degrade performance and raise privacy risks.

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  81% of Iranian internet users bypass censorship with VPNs - Parliament

The official also cited access and usage gaps. Roughly 23% of Iranians aged over 15 -- about 15 million people-- do not use the internet at all, he said.

Average daily screen time in Iran stands at about 7 hours 10 minutes across phones, games and media, compared with a global average of roughly 6 hours, Gholami added, describing the figure as a cultural and public-health concern.

Gholami urged a “data-driven, non-political” approach to digital policy, saying survey results suggest domestic services do not fully meet user needs where VPNs are most frequently switched on.

He also flagged emerging security issues from connected devices in homes, saying some smart appliances can transmit detailed data to manufacturers, and called for stronger privacy safeguards.

Iran’s government has long maintained controls on major foreign platforms and says restrictions are necessary for national security.

Witnesses said police, Basij militia and Revolutionary Guards manned checkpoints and turned people back from access routes in Fars province.

Iran has long declined to recognize Cyrus Day in its official calendar, and has in past years restricted access to Pasargadae and, at times, Persepolis to discourage large gatherings around the Achaemenid-era sites.

Security curbs around the October 28-31 anniversary -- linked by some accounts to Cyrus’s entry into Babylon in 539 BCE -- have become routine since large crowds rallied at the tomb in 2016.

The latest closures came amid renewed public debate inside Iran over how to commemorate pre-Islamic heritage.

Ghader Ashna, secretary of the Public Culture Council at the culture ministry, told the ISNA news agency that over the past year no formal request had reached his body to add “Cyrus Day” to the national calendar, but said any proposal would be reviewed by a dedicated working group and the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution.

Separately, ISNA quoted cultural scholar Bahman Namvar-Motlagh as saying that honoring Cyrus did not contradict Iran’s Islamic identity and could help bolster social cohesion if handled without “excess or confrontation.”

He framed interest in Cyrus among younger Iranians as part of a broader search for common symbols of national unity in a tense regional environment.

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Rights activist and Nobel Peace laureate Narges Mohammadi marked the day with a message on Instagram describing Cyrus as a “cultural symbol” associated with tolerance and justice, and contrasted that legacy with Iran’s record on political freedoms and capital punishment.

Exiled opposition figure Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s last shah, told supporters at a Toronto event earlier this month that a future post-Islamic Republic order should elevate the 2020 Abraham Accords into what he called “Cyrus Accords,” recasting Iran as a promoter of regional peace rather than conflict.

Cyrus the Great, who founded the Achaemenid Empire in the 6th century BCE, is widely cited in Iran’s schools and popular culture as a touchstone of nationhood. The Pasargadae site and Persepolis -- both UNESCO-listed -- draw steady domestic and foreign tourism, though access has at times been restricted on sensitive dates.

In 2024, heritage outlets connected to the state reported fencing and concrete barriers on the road to Pasargadae ahead of the October commemorations.

Iranian scientists and officials have separately warned that land subsidence from groundwater over-extraction is emerging as a long-term threat to several heritage sites, including areas around Persepolis and the Tomb of Cyrus.

Geologists cited this month reported cracks and surface fissures in Fars and other provinces, saying cumulative deformation could damage historic fabric over years if water withdrawals are not curbed.

Cyrus Day is not an official holiday, but diaspora communities and some Iranians at home mark it annually with cultural events and online campaigns.

The Islamic Republic’s leadership has historically promoted an Islamic “ummah” identity and has sometimes viewed mass gatherings at pre-Islamic monuments as politically sensitive, especially amid periodic anti-government protests.

Iranian state bodies did not immediately issue a statement on Wednesday’s access limits in Fars.

Former President Hassan Rouhani is being targeted by hardline lawmakers, Revolutionary Guards commanders, and state-aligned media outlets. Even figures close to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appear to have joined the quiet campaign to sideline him.

Although social media sentiment leans in Rouhani’s favor, visible public support is absent. The only voices defending him belong to former aides, not the broader population.

Much of the hostility stems from Rouhani’s recent remarks implicitly criticizing Tehran’s foreign policy—particularly the so-called “Look East” doctrine—and his renewed public presence since the 12-day war, which has coincided with Khamenei’s retreat from the spotlight.

Many in Tehran believe Rouhani is positioning himself for a potential role in the power vacuum that could follow the soon-to-be 87-year-old leader.

History with the Guards

In the past week, former IRGC commander Mohammad Ali Jafari, ex-security chief Ali Shamkhani, and parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—himself a former Guards general—have all publicly attacked Rouhani.

His uneasy relationship with the Revolutionary Guards dates back to his presidency.

In December 2014, he described the IRGC as “a government with guns, media outlets, prisons, its own intelligence agency, and substantial economic resources,” warning that such concentrated power could breed corruption.

The backlash was swift. Rouhani’s brother was accused of financial misconduct, tried, and imprisoned—though often seen outside prison—damaging the president’s credibility.

Old rivalries reignited

Rouhani defeated conservative and hardline candidates in both the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections with sharp rhetoric, and his opponents never forgave him.

Ghalibaf was among the contenders on both occasions.

First, he was humiliated during televised debates when Rouhani accused him of taking campaign funds from drug traffickers and backing the violent suppression of student protests in 1999. Then, in 2017, Ghalibaf was pressured by hardliners to withdraw from the race to boost Ebrahim Raisi’s chances—a strategy that failed.

That old hostility is now resurfacing in parliament, where Ghalibaf has taken the lead in attacks on Rouhani. He has been more measured in tone, but ultraconservatives appear to have taken the cue.

On October 26, hardline MPs Amir Hossein Sabeti and Hamid Rasai called for Rouhani’s trial and imprisonment.

While such demands aren’t new, Sabeti went further, claiming Rouhani is positioning himself for a “higher role”—a thinly veiled reference to his rumored ambition to become Iran’s next Supreme Leader.

A potential contender?

Rouhani remains a singular figure among Iran’s clerics: he holds genuine academic credentials, speaks with eloquence, and has a revolutionary pedigree.

Few clerics can match his combination of seniority and stature.

It’s not hard to see why Khamenei and his son Mojtaba—whose name is heard more than any other in succession chatter—would like Rouhani weakened.

There’s no evidence that the leader’s office is involved in what appears to be a concerted attack on Rouhani, but Khamenei once publicly rebuked him after the former president called for a referendum to restore presidential powers.

Fall from grace

Rouhani’s main liability is his loss of public trust.

He misled the nation about the IRGC’s missile strike on a civilian airliner in 2020 and authorized the violent suppression of peaceful protests in 2019.

Stylistically, he models himself after Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, the former chief justice killed in a 1981 bombing.

Always impeccably dressed, with a neatly groomed salt-and-pepper beard, he projects discipline and control—and is perhaps the only senior figure in the moderate camp who can claim a serious security record.

As pressure mounts, many in Tehran wonder whether this campaign against Rouhani will end well—for him or for the system.

His situation recalls the parable of a man falling from a high-rise building. When asked how things were going halfway down, he replied, “So far, so good.”