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Energy crisis dominates Pezeshkian's cabinet hearings

Aug 21, 2024, 09:55 GMT+1Updated: 16:06 GMT+0
Abbas Aliabadi, President Masoud Pezeshkian's proposed Minister of Energy, 21 August, 2024.
Abbas Aliabadi, President Masoud Pezeshkian's proposed Minister of Energy, 21 August, 2024.

The pressing issue of the energy crisis, which has reached a tipping point, took center stage in the Wednesday parliamentary hearings for President Masoud Pezeshkian's cabinet approval.

Lawmaker Hamidreza Goudarzi described the ongoing energy shortfall and frequent water and electricity outages as a "critical crisis for the Islamic Republic." He warned that this issue is on the verge of inflicting serious damage on the industrial sector and further fueling public discontent.

Mansour Alimardani, the representative from Abhar, referred to the frequent power outages in industrial zones, "The power cuts have devastated many industrialists."

The main reason for lack of power in a country that has the second largest natural gas reserves in the world is lack of investments and inefficiency in management. Iran is deprived of foreign investments due to its confrontational foreign policy and a nuclear program deemed dangerous by many countries. The government also fails to invest in infrastructure, prioritizing the military and foreign adventures.

MP Mohsen Biglari observed, "Throughout this sweltering summer, we have endured consistent household power outages, with agricultural electricity being disrupted for five to six hours daily. Given these circumstances, can we genuinely expect a surge in agricultural production? Furthermore, 40% of our villages lack access to household water supply networks; even among those connected, more than half rely on severely outdated plumbing systems."

Abbas Aliabadi, the proposed Minister of Energy, also identified electricity and water shortages as a fundamental governance issue, asserting that it transcends the mere effects of seasonal heat. He projected that, based on current estimates, the annual shortfall in electricity could surpass 18,000 megawatts.

Aliabadi also highlighted that the National Development Fund has deprioritized investments in the electricity sector, noting that the Ministry of Energy's accumulated obligations have led to significant losses for previous investors, deterring new investments.

The ministerial nominee opposed the "burdensome government bureaucracy," underscoring that "the government should not, and cannot, serve as the primary executor."

On the issue of water, Aliabadi pointed out that the current negative water balance stands at six billion cubic meters annually. He issued a stern warning: "The water situation is critical. We are at a tipping point, and continuing this trajectory is untenable."

Despite the discussions, no substantive solutions were proposed. The only measure presented as a remedy was Aliabadi’s pledge to "empower citizens to sell their electricity quotas in a competitive market." He explained that individuals would have the option to either consume their electricity or sell it at premium international or industrial rates, thereby realizing the true value of their assets. However, this presupposes a reliable supply of electricity—a currently unmet condition.

In recent years, the Islamic government has consistently struggled to meet the nation's electricity demands, with recurrent failures plunging hundreds of cities and villages into darkness each summer. This year, however, the situation has reached a critical inflection point, as the frequency and duration of blackouts have escalated, reflecting an increasingly stark disparity between supply and demand.

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Pezeshkian cabinet's sole agenda: Obedience to Khamenei

Aug 21, 2024, 07:52 GMT+1
•
Niloufar Goudarzi

On Tuesday, an Iranian lawmaker, defending the proposed minister of science, stated that the nominee is 'fervently loyal' to the core principles of the establishment and fully aligned with Supreme Leader's directives.

This mode of defense has become central to the parliamentary hearings, where legislators are tasked with ratifying the ministerial appointments made by the newly elected president, Masoud Pezeshkian.

In theory, the president and his cabinet are required to present a comprehensive governance agenda. In practice, however, the discourse has largely bypassed substantive policy discussions, focusing instead on the ministers' loyalty and compliance, especially their willingness to align with Ali Khamenei's directives.

Contrary to parliamentary expectations, Pezeshkian has not presented a detailed road map for his administration. Instead, he has merely cited the Seventh Development Plan—a continuation of the framework approved during Ebrahim Raisi's tenure in November 2023—and reiterated his commitment to the policies endorsed by Khamenei. Critics say that the Seventh Plan itself is an unrealistic document, full of economic wishes that simply cannot be realized. It is the continuation of the previous failed plan.

Iran's Sixth Five-Year National Development Plan, originally slated to conclude in 2021, was extended to mid-2024 due to its failure to achieve its intended economic objectives. According to an analysis by the Parliament Research Center, only 30% of the plan was partially implemented, 40% remained unaddressed, and the remaining 30% could not be accurately assessed. Despite its formal approval, the parliament has deemed the latest plan deficient.

Pezeshkian's strategy appears to be a mere perpetuation of this existing plan, coupled with a vague adherence to Khamenei’s orders, devoid of any substantive detail. MPs defending the proposed ministers similarly lean on this rationale, equating loyalty to the establishment with a sound governance strategy, effectively rebranding familiar rhetoric as policy.

While the overwhelming majority of the proposed ministers are expected to receive parliament’s endorsement—dominated as it is by hardline factions—there have nonetheless been murmurs of discontent within the legislative body.

In their addresses, a few dissenting MPs expressed concerns that Pezeshkian has failed to present an independent policy framework separate from the Seventh Development Plan, limiting the scope for meaningful debate or opposition.

Alireza Salimi, a Tehran representative, took issue with Pezeshkian's approach, noting that he has merely reiterated the Seventh Development Plan as his own rather than offering a novel or detailed strategy. Salimi emphasized, "The Guardian Council has already approved the Seventh Development Plan. Thus, debating support or opposition to it is a futile exercise."

Another parliamentarian, Mehdi Kouchakzadeh, raised a procedural objection, underscoring that the primary objective of the session was to "examine the government’s program." Addressing Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the Speaker of the Parliament, the lawmaker, inquired, "Has Pezeshkian’s plan been submitted to you for dissemination among us?"

He further highlighted that Pezeshkian has claimed his agenda is grounded in the Nahj al-Balagha—a centuries-old compilation of sermons, letters, and sayings attributed to the first Shia Imam, Ali, which Pezeshkian often recites in Arabic—and the vision of the Supreme Leader. Kouchakzadeh then provocatively questioned, "Are the dissenting MPs opposing the Nahj al-Balagha and the Seventh Development Plan?"

Government expert admits Iran gains little from oil deals with China

Aug 20, 2024, 23:45 GMT+1
•
Niloufar Goudarzi

An expert from an institute affiliated with Iran's Ministry of Oil has raised concerns about the country's oil dealings with China, revealing that these transactions bring minimal financial returns for Iran.

"Today, we are selling oil under deplorable conditions—at low prices with steep discounts—and in return, we are importing substandard Chinese goods at best," Morteza Behrouzifar from the Institute of International Energy Studies remarked in a candid discussion with a local website about the ongoing challenges facing Iran’s oil industry.

In an interview with ILNA, Behrouzifar further highlighted that Iran's current situation leaves it heavily reliant on China, which poses significant risks to the nation's economic sovereignty. This starkly contrasts with official claims that Iran sells crude oil to 17 nations, including some in Europe.

The expert also criticized the broader strategic missteps within the oil sector, describing them as rooted in "showmanship" rather than substantive achievements.

Over the past three years, he said there have been claims of massive foreign economic contracts—exceeding $100 billion—but these were often mere memorandums of understanding presented as binding agreements.

He argued that this has led to the depletion of national resources, including the National Development Fund (NDF), without any significant return on investment. "We did not achieve any results proportionate to the money invested," he noted, underscoring the inefficacy of these deals.

NDF, Iran's national wealth fund, is intended to reserve around 30% of oil profits for future generations. However, due to international sanctions and an inefficient economy that have perpetually strained the government's budget, the majority of the over $100 billion in savings has already been depleted.

The most recent instance that could be inferred from his remarks is the May agreement, in which Tehran Municipality discreetly finalized a two-billion-euro contract with a Chinese firm for the import of transport and traffic surveillance equipment, including electric buses. This clandestine deal sparked significant backlash, even among members of the city council.

"The president of the 14th government [Masoud Pezeshkian] must understand that if these conditions continue, the oil industry will not be able to survive," Behrouzifar warned.

Despite US sanctions reinstated in 2018 over Iran's nuclear program, China has continued to purchase Iranian oil, but under conditions that are far from favorable to Iran.

Last July, The Wall Street Journal reported that Iran's crude oil exports had surged to their highest levels in five years, albeit at steep discounts of up to $30 per barrel. The report corroborated estimates indicating that Iran exported 1.6 million barrels per day in May and June, a significant increase from the 250,000 barrels per day recorded in 2019 and 2020, shortly after the US reimposed comprehensive sanctions.

In addition to discounts, China apparently does not pay in cash for most of the oil, because Iran is also under US banking sanctions. Although on paper Iran annual oil revenues reach $35 billion, it is not clear how much hard currency Tehran receives.

China imports Iranian oil through tankers, which avoid detection by operating without transponders. Known as "ghost ships" or "dark fleets," these vessels employ sophisticated methods to conceal their ownership and movements, enabling them to circumvent international sanctions. They partake in high-risk operations such as ship-to-ship transfers in open waters and deactivate Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders to mask their identities and evade detection.

Once they reach Chinese shores, the oil is rebranded as Malaysian or Middle Eastern crude. It is primarily bought by "teapots," small independent refineries that have absorbed the bulk of Iran's oil exports since larger state-owned refineries withdrew due to sanction fears.

As the Atlantic Council reports, China’s payments to Iran are made in renminbi through smaller, US-sanctioned financial institutions like the Bank of Kunlun. This minimizes exposure for China’s larger banks but leaves Iran with limited options for using the currency.

Iran's rhetoric softens as it balances retaliation for Hamas leader

Aug 20, 2024, 19:25 GMT+1

Ali-Mohammad Naini, the spokesperson for the IRGC, tempered Iran’s rhetoric on Tuesday, adopting a more measured tone regarding sharp revenge for the killing of Ismail Haniyeh.

Israel has neither confirmed nor denied involvement in Haniyeh's assassination in the Iranian capital on July 31, which further escalating the already tense relations between Tehran and Tel Aviv.

Naini remarked, "Time is on our side, and the waiting period for this response may be prolonged." This shift suggests a strategic withdrawal from Tehran’s earlier threats of immediate and severe retaliation against Israel, as Tehran reportedly delays its strike to avoid disrupting ongoing ceasefire talks aimed at ending the Gaza conflict.

Despite the apparent de-escalation, Naini insisted that "the enemy should expect calculated and precise strikes at the right time," and added that Iran's response might not mirror its past operations.

Naini further claimed that Israel failed to achieve its objectives with the assassination of Haniyeh, arguing that the "Resistance Front" has only grown stronger. He emphasized Iran's resolve to respond to what he described as “the Zionist regime's aggressions,” warning that “those in the occupied territories” are now suffering the consequences of Netanyahu's actions.

Jason Brodsky, the policy director for United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), noted that Naini's remarks about "a long wait" for Israel are rooted in his role as one of the IRGC's top "experts" in psychological warfare and soft war.

He referred to an article by New Lines Magazine in which two Iran experts Saeed Golkar and Kasra Aarabi say Naini’s appointment was made by the Supreme Leader’s representative to the IRGC, Abdollah Haji Sadeghi, rather than by the commander-in-chief, Hossein Salami. The importance of this change is highlighted by the fact that Naini's predecessor, Ramazan Sharif, held the role for more than 18 years.

“An assessment of Naini’s expertise and experience in the context of the responsibilities of his role as deputy for public relations reveals a lot about the future trajectory of the IRGC. His appointment is a clear indication that the supreme leader’s office is preparing to step up the IRGC’s psychological warfare operations and intends to better coordinate control over its propaganda, communications and PR operations,” reads their article.

“The appointment of Naini reveals the direction of travel for the IRGC. The speed with which Naini asserted himself to limit the damage to the IRGC following reports that foreign infiltration was responsible for Haniyeh’s assassination gives an indication of the aggressive approach to propaganda and cognitive war the IRGC will take under his tenure.”

Naeini’s comments come after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned Iran and its allies of severe consequences should they choose to attack.

At the start of a weekly cabinet meeting on Sunday, Netanyahu issued a warning to Iran and Hezbollah, emphasizing Israel's preparedness to defend itself against any threats from these adversaries.

"We are determined to defend ourselves, and we are also determined to extract a very heavy price from any enemy that dares to attack us, from any theater," Netanyahu underlined.

Netanyahu also reaffirmed Israel’s commitment to its security principles, insisting they would remain non-negotiable despite the complexities of the peace talks.

Israel remains engaged in indirect negotiations with Hamas, with mediation efforts led by Qatar, the United States, and Egypt. The talks, held in Doha over the past week, aim to secure the release of Israeli hostages captured by Hamas during the October 7 attacks, which resulted in the deaths of approximately 1,100 Israelis. Despite these efforts, substantial disagreements persist between the two sides.

What prompted Iranians’ rush to buy gold on Sunday?

Aug 20, 2024, 19:20 GMT+1
•
Maryam Sinaiee

Even goldsmiths were taken aback as huge crowds gathered outside their shops on Sunday, eager to purchase anything from small pieces to expensive gold jewelry. The sudden 'gold rush' was not driven by changes in prices.

Photos and videos posted on social media showed big crowds outside jewelry shops in many areas of Tehran and other cities from the early business hours of Sunday.

The 'gold rush' was triggered by a religious superstition encouraged by some influencers online, who urged people to buy some gold for attracting wealth, or symbols of other big items such as cars that they wish to have.

Mohammad Kashtiaray, Deputy Chairman of Goldsmiths and Jewelers’ Union, says he had never seen such a rush to buy gold in his 64 years of trade. According to Kashtiaray, the rush to buy gold pushed up the prices of gold and gold coins although international prices had remained the same.

He also said most people had purchased very tiny items weighing one gram or less and pointed out the role of social media in forming people’s beliefs and behavior.

There is still no information on the amount of gold sold on Sunday, but prices on Monday were somehow higher than in the past few days.

In a post on X, a gold shop in an arcade in northwest Tehran said they had to stop selling gold coins, which many Iranians buy as an investment, to meet the demand for the gold jewelry on display.

Many people who rushed to buy gold said this was because there was some religious wisdom about purchasing gold on this day.

Some netizens say people were also buying keychains in the hope of being able to purchase homes and cars, or dolls to have children.

“Dream sellers sold dreams to a society whose purchasing power has shrunk… Such happenings are not strange where [economic] development is lacking,” journalist Zahra Ali-Akbari contended in an article published by the moderate Khabar Online news website.

Sunday was the 13th of the Islamic month of Safar in the unofficial lunar Islamic calendar that many Iranians who keep up with religious feasts and other occasions are quite familiar with.

Netizens say the unprecedented rush to buy gold this year was spurred by social media posts claiming the sixth Shia Imam, Imam Ja’far Sadiq (702-765 CE), recommended buying gold on this day to become prosperous. The quote from the Imam, some others say, is not substantiated by any authoritative religious source. 

The Instagram and Telegram posts that attributed the recommendation to the sixth Imam were posted by both gold sellers and jewelry businesses and influencers. Whether this was a coordinated campaign by goldsmiths or importers or only spurred by superstition is difficult to gauge.

“Did they really write in Instagram that buying gold on the 13th of Safar is auspicious and people went and did that? Didn’t they think why nobody had heard of this before? Didn’t they think it may have been a marketing campaign by goldsmiths to make up for the slow business in the months of Moharram and Safar?” Iranian journalist Yeganeh Khodami took to X to ask.

In Shia Iran, some businesses, including gold and jewelry shops, experience a setback in these months as many prepare to partake in religious mourning ceremonies.

Another Iranian journalist, Maryam Shokrani, also took to X to comment on the ‘gold rush’. “This degree of superstition is unbelievable!” she wrote.

Iran shuts down German language school in likely act of retaliation

Aug 20, 2024, 13:56 GMT+1
•
Benjamin Weinthal

Iran's security forces stormed the German Embassy-affiliated language school in Tehran on Tuesday, shutting down its operations in what appears to be a retaliatory move for Berlin’s closure of the Khamenei-controlled Islamic Center of Hamburg and the Blue Mosque.

The German Foreign Ministry issued a strong statement condemning the Iranian regime's actions. “We condemn the Iranian security authorities’ action against the German Language Institute in Tehran. There can be no justification for this. Language exchange is fundamental to mutual understanding. The Institute is a well-known and cherished place where people go to great lengths to promote language learning under challenging conditions. Its staff are highly dedicated to their work, which aims, among other things, to strengthen the ties between the people of Iran and Germany,” the ministry stated.

The statement also announced that the Iranian Ambassador would be summoned to the Federal Foreign Office. “We call on the new Iranian government to allow the Institute to resume teaching immediately,” it added.

Jason Brodsky, the policy director for the think tank United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), told Iran International, that “The Iranians are trying to create an equivalence between the Islamic Center of Hamburg (IZH) and the institute, where there is none. IZH was engaged in supporting terrorism. The institute was teaching language classes. It’s a tit-for-tat propaganda stunt to please domestic hardline audiences in Tehran. European governments, including Germany, should be downsizing their presence in Iran anyway given the security risks there."

According to the X account @mamlekate that provides news from within Iran, "Today at noon, they stormed into the Goethe Institute on Dibaji Street and the Gholhak Educational Institute in Tehran, forcibly removing the teachers, staff, and those taking German exams, using violence. They had cameras and a large number of officers. They were shouting, 'Where do you think you're going?' Afterwards, the NOPO forces tore down the signs and sealed off the institute, which is affiliated with the German Embassy."

One influential pro-Iran regime account on X urged in late July that Iran’s regime shut the institute.

Sheina Vojoudi, an Iranian who fled the Islamic Republic and now lives in Germany, told Iran International that she studied German at the Goethe Institut in Tehran. “There are nationwide protests by nurses in Iran. Many educated Iranians are trying to leave the country because of the Islamic Republic's corruption and incompetence, and the regime is trying to stop them. That may be one reason, but the main reason is that the closure of the Blue Mosque [in Germany] has been very difficult for the regime and they are trying to retaliate."

She added that Germany should continue to fight "the terrorists of the Islamic Republic and prevent them from continuing their terrorism on German soil and Germany should respond very harshly: end the city partnerships, close all the Islamic centers of the regime, cut off relations with the Islamic Republic and designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization, in short, maximum support for the Iranian people, maximum pressure on the Islamic Republic.

Vojoudi, who is an associate fellow for the Gold Institute for International Strategy, added, “I learned the German language in 2015… I don't remember the exact date, but I attended the German language course for almost a year.”

According to a statement on the website of the Goethe Institute, “From 1958 until 1987, the Goethe-Institut had its own center in Tehran. Then, in 1995, the German Embassy opened the Deutsche Sprachinstitut Tehran (DSIT). A Goethe-Institut expert runs it.“

Iran’s regime closed the Institute in 1981 because of a diplomatic spat between Berlin and Tehran, according to a Wikipedia entry. Iran International could not independently verify the 1981 closure.

Iran International sent press queries to the German Goethe Institute in Germany and in Tehran and to the German government. The Facebook page of the Goethe Institute in Tehran was down.

Katrin Sohns, a spokeswoman for the Goethe Institute in Germany, told Iran International "Thanks for your request on the situation of the Deutsche Sprachinstitut in Teheran (DSIT)." She referred questions to the German foreign ministry.

There are currently campaigns in Germany run by Iranian dissidents to compel the mayor of Freiburg, Martin Horn, to end his city’s partnership with Isfahan. German-Iranian dissidents, who are part of the US Iranian-American organization AAIRIA, launched a campaign to force the Hamburg-based pro-Iran regime Körber Foundation to sever ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran and former Iranian regime ambassador to Germany, Hossein Mousavian.