Twice Oscar Winner Iranian Filmmaker Tells IRGC: I Hate You!

Raisi highlighted the need to conclude a new comprehensive agreement with Russia. "We are ready to conclude the document on long-term comprehensive cooperation between the two countries in order to accelerate the process of the further expansion of bilateral interaction," Tass news agency quoted him as saying.

The two presidents touched upon a series of regional issues, including Afghanistan and tension in the South Caucasus, the official IRNA news website said.

Rouhani also thanked Putin for Russia’s positions on Iran’s nuclear issue and the lifting of US sanctions, saying that Tehran insists on removing them.

Multilateral talks in Vienna aimed at reviving the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran are scheduled to resume in less than two weeks. Iran interrupted its participation in the talks in June and after a five-month delay and pressure by the West it has finally agreed to return to negotiations.

Raisi also thanked Russia for its efforts for “stability and calm in southern Caucasus, where after a war between Armenia and Azerbaijan last year tensions remain high. IRNA said the two sides emphasized that any geopolitical change of international borders in that region would not be acceptable.

Putin promised to expedite a 20-year cooperation agreement with Iran and help boost the level of bilateral economic and trade ties. He also highlighted cooperation in Syria and said, “We succeeded with a lot of effort to save Syria’s independence and destroy the nucleus of terrorists in that country’” IRNA reported.

Russia’s Tass news agency said that Raisi spoke about shared interests and emphasized that "the positions of Tehran and Moscow are close on many international issues. Opposing the unilateral approach and boosting multipolarity are the common features of the two states.”

Iran’s existing cooperation agreement with Russia dates to 2001 and it has been extended every five years, but last year Tehran asked to review and expand the agreement.

With its economy under the pressure of US sanctions, Iran has been trumpeting the need to expand ties with “the East”, meaning mainly Russia and China. It has also signed a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement with Beijing.

In June, Iran’s Khazar Exploration and Production Company (Kepco), then touted as the field’s main developer, suggested the field held 30 percent of the developable natural gas reserves of all Caspian Sea littoral counties and could potentially meet 20 percent of all European demand for gas.

But those figures may need revising, upwards - a point well grasped in Moscow. According to Simon Watkins, of Oilprice.com, further studies have revealed that the field has far more reserves than previously thought, with a total 7.1 trillion cubic meters, fully half the reserves of South Pars, Iran’s huge field in the Persian Gulf.

Watkins reported Monday that this has led to a revised understanding, during the Tehran-Moscow cooperation discussions, that would see for 20 years 40 percent share of output go to Russia’s Gazprom and Transneft, 28 percent to China’s CNPC (China National Petroleum Corporation) and CNOOC (China National Offshore Oil Corporation), and only 25 percent to Iran’s Kepco. This division (more on the missing 7 percent below) would apply even though the field falls within Iranian sovereignty.

Such an agreement, Watkins suggested, would enable Russia to head off any potential challenge to its own place in the European market – while presumably keep up gas prices to both Russia’s and Iran’s benefit – posed by a new supply of Iranian gas if US sanctions ended.

The advantages for Iran would be bringing in Transneft for transportation, CNPP for financing, CNOOC for infrastructure and engineering, one source told Watkins. The deal would also give Iran some level of Russian political support internationally, including in future issues over Iran’s nuclear program and its 2015 nuclear deal with world powers, the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action).

And the pot is large. With Transneft reporting to Moscow that latest research suggests Chalous could supply 52 percent – rather than 20 percent – of Europe’s needs over the 20 years of the agreement, the financial benefits to Iran would be significant. A 28 percent share of a gas field potentially worth $450 billion over 20 years would be $5.6 billion annually or a total of $112 billion.

IRGC ‘real management’

Such benefits could be particularly useful, Watkins suggested, for “hydrocarbons companies closely associated with the Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)” that would exercise the “real management” over the Iranian operation and would scoop the missing 7 percent from the carve up. Once the 20-year agreement ended, remaining exploitation of Chalous would lie with the IRGC construction arm, Khatam-ol Anbia, leaving it the lion’s share of a total value of the field now put overall at a staggering $5.4 trillion.

Imponderables remain. There has been talk of European investment in the field – but this would surely depend on the easing of United States sanctions that drove out of South Pars operators like Total, a world leader in offshore gas and in liquefaction.

And while Russia and China are both increasingly evading US sanctions, including through reducing dollar-denominated trade both bilaterally to under 50 percent and around the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, it is hard to see Chalous field developing its real potential and fully tapping European demand with stringent US sanctions in place.

Complications might also arise in domestic Iranian politics, where government critics may denounce a diminution in sovereignty and loss of resources. If either proves a bitter pill to swallow, the taste will not be sweetened by Watson’s calculation that the new Chalous figures when counted as sovereign Iranian assets − with allowance made for Russia’s own figures being out of date − mean Iran has now the world’s biggest gas reserves.

Jonathan Karl’s Betrayal: The Final Act of the Trump Show, released today, describes a November 12, 2020 meeting, shortly after the disputed November 3 election, when Miller talked through with Trump and top officials a response to an International Atomic Energy Agency report. The IAEA warned that Iran had increased its stockpile of enriched uranium to the point where it could make enough weapons-grade uranium for two bombs within six months.

Trump turned to Miller, according to Karl’s book, and asked if Iran’s nuclear sites could be taken out from the air. "Yes, Mr President," replied Miller. "We can absolutely do that."

But 100 manned flights would be needed, given Iran’s air defense, and “three, four or six planes” would probably be shot down, Miller told Trump. “I just want to make sure you are comfortable with that.” Trump was worried about things going wrong, especially Boeing’s involvement in air-to-air refueling as “they can't build s**t anymore."

Miller’s tactic worked. An alarmed Mike Pompeo, the secretary of state, phoned Bill Barr, the attorney general, to get him onside.

"I would play the f***ing madman," Miller told Karl. "And everybody else would be like, ‘All right, he’s the new guy. He's fucking insane…I have found oftentimes with provocative people, if you get more provocative than them, they then have to dial it down.”

The Trump emerging in Karl’s account is unpredictable and ignorant – but a man consistently skeptical of force and committed to withdrawing US troops from foreign theaters, an aim more common among the left of the Democratic Party than amid right-wing Republicans.

100%

The writing had been on the wall for at least a year. Trump had in 2018 withdrawn from the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal and imposed ‘maximum pressure’ sanctions that he and apparently Pompeo believed would force Iran into broad concessions over its missile and nuclear programs and to curb its regional alliances.

Ten minutes to go

But did Trump have a plan B? A long piece in the New York Times in September 2019 highlighted Trump’s June 20 decision not to retaliate against Iran for shooting down a US surveillance drone. With ships aiming Tomahawk missiles, jets in the sky, and 10,000 sailors and airmen mobilized, Trump called of strikes with ten minutes to go after being told 150 Iranians would die.

The Times argued that the “about-face, so typically impulsive, instinctive and removed from any process” was a turning point in Trump’s presidency, one that

“was taken by Iran as a sign of weakness, emboldening it to attack” Saudi oil facilities at Buqaiq and Khurais in September 2019.

Trump’s response to the Buqaiq-Khurais attack – in which Iran denied involvement – was just to tighten financial sanctions.

But the Times even before that attack had noted that “as eager as he is to fight with 280 characters on Twitter, Mr Trump has proved profoundly reluctant to fight with live ammunition on a real battlefield.” The paper highlighted the influence on Trump of Fox News, especially presenter Tucker Carlson, always keen to remind the president he had been elected to stop wars, not start them.

Not ready to respond

In a meeting in Congress over the drone shooting down, Trump, according the NYT piece, “rambled on about how bad Mr Obama’s deal [the 2015 nuclear agreement] had been and insisted over and over again …that his pressure campaign would force Iran to the bargaining table. He seemed less certain about what to do in response to the drone shootdown.”

The picture emerging from Karl’s Betrayal: The Final Act of the Trump Show confirms the NYT portrayal. Trump essentially repeated a mistake made by Barak Obama in failing to act in 2013 when President Bashar al-Assad apparently crossed a “red line” set by Obama over the use of chemical weapons.

In that sense, Miller’s “f***ing madman” act had more sense than the president’s responses. “Trump is in a box of his own making,” Philip Gordon, a Middle East adviser to Obama, told the Times in 2019. “He has put in place policies…guaranteed to provoke an aggressive Iranian response, but he’s not prepared to respond aggressively in turn, and the Iranians know it.”

Iran International published on April 25 a three-hour confidential interview with Zarif meant to remain in government archives, that led to a political storm in Iran.

In the interview Zarif spoke about the interference of the military in Iran’s foreign policy, specifically referring to the role of former IRGC Quds force commander Qasem Soleimani, who was killed by a US drone strike in Baghdad in January 2020.

At the time, President Hassan Rouhani ordered an investigation into who had leaked the tape to Iran International, which is not allowed to have a bureau or any presence in Iran.

The Judiciary’s spokesman told local media on Tuesday that many people have been interviewed about the leak, but the case is still pending.

In the interview Zarif had also mentioned that former US secretary of state John Kerry had divulged to him, possibly in 2017, that Israel was attacking Iranian targets in Syria. The information led to Congressional questions from Kerry, who denied ever having disclosed confidential information to Zarif.

Of 260 lawmakers present, 140 opposed Raisi's [Raeesi] candidate, Masoud Fayazi, while 115 voted in favor and five abstained.

The parliament's opposition had revealed itself last week when Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf (Qalibaf) announced the nomination on November 9. Lawmakers drowned the speaker's voice by their shouts of disapproval.

Having nominated Fayazi November 8, Raisi attended the session to say he and colleagues had interviewed him and rated him an excellent candidate. His vehement defense of Fayazi and his presence in the parliament to back his candidate made the defeat even more damaging for Raisi.

100%

Fayazi’s critics highlighted alleged discrepancies in his career, suggesting he taught in university before getting a bachelor's degree in civil engineering that took him 15 years to complete. They suggested he had taken nine years to achieve a master's degree in Islamic law without getting “full accreditation.” They disputed his doctorate and said he had never taught in a school or been a school principal.

In his speech to parliament, Raisi disputed charges of nepotism – based on Fayazi being a relative of Tehran mayor Alireza Zakani – and argued that it was unjust to ignore a person’s achievements because of any connections they might have. The president suggested that the nomination was based on “God’s approval…proven to me as a jurist.”

100%

Rejection of Raisi's second nominee signifies that the conservative majority in parliament is not prepared to offer the president unconditional support. Iranian media already proclaims “the end of the honeymoon” with many principlists expressing disapproval of Raisi's choices for ministerial positions and lack of clear plans to deal with multiple crises facing Iran.

Allegations of nepotism are a staple of Iranian politics and were quickly made against Raisi, who took office in August. Fayazi is the brother of Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani's son-in-law. Zakani's own appointment by the new conservative-dominated Tehran city council in August highlighted a lively division in the camp.

In August, the parliament approved all Raisi’s ministerial nominations except for education minister, Hossein Baghgoli, who is reportedly a relative of his wife. Raisi is the son-in-law of the Friday prayer imam of Mashhad, Iran's second largest city.

Raisi has only one week left of three months allowed for approving ministers. If he fails to present another candidate, or the candidate is again rejected, the president will need to appoint a caretaker for three months or assume responsibility for the ministry himself. The law requires a caretaker minister to be approved by the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.